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Introduction*
Security sector reform (SSR) and mine action occur in many different settings
ranging from war-torn to post-conflict and developed countries. However, both
fields of activity are most commonly implemented in post-conflict contexts. The
United Nations (UN) Capstone Doctrine testifies to this view by listing SSR and
mine action among the “critical peacebuilding activities”,1 alongside disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration (DDR), protection and promotion of human
rights, electoral assistance and support to state authority. Mindful of this fact and
the window of opportunities resulting from it, the present research focuses on
post-conflict peacebuilding contexts.
Despite their relevance in post-conflict peacebuilding, SSR and mine action
seem to belong to separate communities of practice and the linkages between the
two fields remain weak. This paper aims to address this disconnection by seeking
to answer the following research questions.
•• What are the conceptual linkages between SSR and mine action?
•• To what extent and how are these conceptual linkages operationalized on the
ground?
•• How could the interaction between SSR and mine action be more effectively
operationalized?
* The authors express their gratitude to Jakob Donatz for his assistance and support in the initial phases of
writing this paper.
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The paper posits that SSR and mine action have a strong common conceptual
basis, which draws from a shared understanding of security. They both contribute
to a concept of security that is not limited to the level of the state, but takes into
account security threats and needs at societal and individual levels. This common
basis provides opportunities for synergies between SSR and mine action, by which
we understand the possibility of achieving greater impact through improved
interaction rather than actions implemented in silos.2
However, empirical evidence demonstrates that linkages and interactions
between SSR and mine action remain limited and underexplored. The respective
programmes have a tendency to be implemented in distinct clusters, without
much interaction. This paper argues that stronger linkages between SSR and
mine action would be beneficial for both domains, and that the concept of human
security provides a comprehensive framework which can bridge the differences
and open broader opportunities for cooperation.
The first section of the paper aims to demonstrate that SSR and mine action
reflect a similar conceptualization of security – human security. The second
section shows how this similarity is translated into a common theoretical approach
in establishing and implementing programmes. The third section is empirical
and explores how SSR and mine action interact at operational level, both within
and beyond UN peacekeeping/peacebuilding missions. The conclusion sums
up the findings and depicts how the concept of human security may help in
strengthening synergies between SSR and mine action.
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Conceptualization of
Security: A Broadened
Perspective
This section demonstrates that SSR and mine action contribute to the same
concept of security, namely human security, and that the emergence of this concept
influenced the evolution of both SSR and mine action towards a broadening of
their respective fields of activity. The section also addresses the impact of this
broadened perspective on security in post-conflict peacekeeping and peacebuilding,
and thereby how SSR and mine action have become essential programmes
in such contexts. It lays the conceptual foundation based on which the paper
scrutinizes the existing and potential interaction between SSR and mine action.

Human security as a conceptual framework: Objectives and principles
Security has traditionally been understood as a matter of survival or
self-preservation of the state, with defence issues such as border control and
military posture at the forefront. In the post-Cold War era, civil wars increasingly
emerged as the most common form of armed conflict instead of interstate wars,
affecting more and more civilian populations. As a result, the traditional concept
of security has widened and deepened, based on the recognition that insecurity
might stem not only from military threats but also from environmental, societal,
political and economic threats.3
This broader concept of security has led to the understanding that individuals
and communities should be the core security concern, and that the security
sector should provide protection from both external and internal threats without
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becoming a threat itself.4 In the words of former Canadian foreign minister,
Lloyd Axworthy, “it has become clear that individual security is not necessarily
the product of national security [and it requires] a shift in focus, from ensuring
peace across State borders to building peace within States”.5 Logically, this leads
to the assumption that the security of the state and the security of its people are
interdependent, and the state is not secure when its population is not secure.6
Human security also provides an alternative perspective on state sovereignty
which, in its traditional sense, relies upon the government’s control over a
territory, the independence of the state and its recognition by other states. While
the human security approach of course does not remove state sovereignty, it
reverses equation: The state is obliged to serve and support its people, from
whom it draws, in theory, its legitimacy.7
The concept of human security was popularised by the 1994 UN
Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report,8 which raised
the importance of threats to human rights, security and development in the
efforts to fight poverty and improve livelihoods. The Report noted that human
security has always been defined as freedom from fear and freedom from want.9
Political, economic, societal and environmental threats began to be addressed as
threats to security,10 and led to the acknowledgement that the lack of security of
people—and not only states—was a major impediment to poverty reduction and
development.11
It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss in depth the debate among
scholars, practitioners and politicians on the concept of human security. However,
it is worth briefly indicating that the understanding of what human security means
and what it encompasses has not been unchallenged. In particular, some critics
view an approach of “freedom from fear and freedom from want” as too broad,
both for theoretical and policy-oriented reasons.12 Firstly, by considering more
harms as security threats, it becomes more difficult to study the relations and
causalities between them. Secondly, the broad definition can also be problematic
for its use at policy level.13 This school of thinking suggests a narrower interpretation that focuses on human security as freedom from fear, meaning the threat
or use of physical violence.
It was only in 2012 that the international community agreed on a definition
of human security, enshrined in UN Resolution 66/290. This definition
considers human security as an approach aimed at “identifying and addressing
widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity
of [member states’] people”, entailing among others the “the right of people to
live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair” and entitling them
“to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to
enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential”.14 The backbone of
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this approach is that security is people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific,
prevention-oriented and nationally owned. States bear the primary responsibility
for ensuring the survival, livelihoods and dignity of their citizens.
In the same resolution, the interlinkages between peace, development and
human rights are clearly articulated. It is argued that SSR and mine action share
many of the building blocks, goals and approaches of human security. Some
stakeholders even perceive the global movement to ban anti-personnel landmines
in the 1990s, with its emphasis on the humanitarian impact rather than the
national security aspects of their use, as a starting point for the human security
approach.15 In the following subsections the evolution of SSR, mine action and
UN peacekeeping/building operations is analysed within this broadened and
more holistic understanding of security.

Security sector reform: Towards comprehensive security and good governance
The concept of SSR emerged with the end of the Cold War and has contributed
to overcoming the traditional definition of security as a field limited exclusively
to the military dimensions of state defence. In particular, as shown in Figure 1,
SSR has produced a double broadening of the concept of security.16 Firstly, SSR
broadens the range of actors typically associated with security by integrating
other dimensions of state security provision besides the military. Secondly, SSR
broadens our understanding of security by moving beyond the state as the only
beneficiary of security to account for the security of individuals and social groups.
Figure 1: Holistic nature of SSR17
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Like the concept of human security, SSR thus reflects the need to address security
concerns in a comprehensive manner. However, SSR does not consist only of this
broader view, but also entails a specific focus on the management and oversight of
the agencies and institutions responsible for delivering security. In other words,
at the core of SSR there is not only the question of effective delivery of security
but also a concern for ensuring that such delivery respects democratic principles,
the rule of law and human rights.18 Ultimately, effectiveness and accountability
are not separable, and both are essential for determining the nature and content
of the reforms that are needed to achieve security for the state and its people.
SSR has been recognized by many major international bodies and states
as a crucial prerequisite for security, peace and development. Despite this, no
generally accepted definition of SSR has yet been proposed, but it is frequently
acknowledged that there is some convergence around the definitions put forward
by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC) and the UN.
In its 2005 guidelines on Security Sector Reform and Governance, the
OECD-DAC describes SSR as seeking “to increase partner countries’ ability to
meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent
with democratic norms and sound governance principles, including transparency
and the rule of law”.19 In the UN context, SSR has been defined as “a process of
assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation
led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and
accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and
with full respect for human rights and the rule of law”.20 Although not identical,
both these definitions have been interpreted as essentially agreeing on three core
features of SSR.
First, SSR must be a locally owned process, meaning that “the reform of
security policies, institutions and activities in a given country must be designed,
managed and implemented by local actors rather than external actors”.21 While it is
true that what can and cannot be achieved by SSR efforts is often greatly dependent
on local power relations and political will, it is also important to emphasize that
local ownership is not synonymous with government ownership.22 Rather, it
implies a people-centred approach that considers the needs of all stakeholders,
particularly those in the most vulnerable and disenfranchised groups.
Second, the two main objectives of the reform process are enhanced
effectiveness and accountability of the security sector. The former refers to
the capability of the security sector to meet the security and justice needs of a
country’s population adequately and ensure the overall well-being of the state
and its citizens. Accountability denotes the manner in which security is provided.
It entails the existence of checks and balances to safeguard against power
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abuses and guarantee that all actors in the security sector provide their services
in accordance with the law. The normative assumptions in this context usually
promote democratic and civilian oversight of the security sector, transparency
and the protection of human rights as indispensable elements of sustainable
accountability.23
A final feature on which most definitions agree is that SSR employs a holistic
approach to reflect the system-wide interconnectedness of security issues. It
makes little sense, for example, to improve the operability of the law enforcement
sector if at the same time mechanisms to interpret the law fail to meet even a
minimum standard of accountability and legitimacy. In accordance with a holistic
approach, reform efforts are therefore not limited to statutory security providers
(the armed forces, police, intelligence services, etc.), but also engage with security
management and oversight bodies (parliament and its relevant legislative
committees, the government, including ministries of defence, etc.); justice and
rule of law institutions (justice ministries, prisons, the judiciary, human rights
commissions and ombuds offices, etc.); non-statutory security forces (liberation
armies, guerrilla armies, private military and security companies, political party
militias, etc.); and civil society groups (the media, research institutions, religious
bodies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community groups, etc.).24
However, this does not mean that SSR should always encompass reforms of all
the components of the security sector. What is essential is to grasp that any SSR
programme, even a narrow one, requires a comprehensive understanding of
the security sector.25 Disregarding the holistic nature of any SSR process would
lead to the “fatal mistake” of believing that effectiveness alone could “trigger
commitment to good governance and a more comprehensive SSR approach”.26
From these three core features, it is important to emphasize three characteristics of SSR that become important when we look at its linkages with mine
action. First, SSR is essentially a political process because it touches on capacities
and functions related to the state’s monopoly of the legitimate use of force.27 In
fact, regardless of the specificities of the implementation context, SSR affects
not only capacities in delivering security but also the control over and oversight
of security providers, and consequently it impacts the balance of power between
the state and the society and among political actors. The political nature of SSR
explains why it is particularly sensitive in post-conflict contexts, where the state
is weak and other actors have significant power and influence on politics. In
such contexts, the challenge for SSR is to overcome resistance and manipulation
aiming at preserving or increasing control over the security services.28
Second, SSR is affected by the context, and “no one-size-fits-all”29 approach
works. This characteristic is related to the political nature of SSR, and its implementation demands a profound understanding of local political actors and dynamics.
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Third, SSR needs to consider a number of cross-cutting issues, like human rights,
gender and financial management, as well as related processes, including DDR,
small arms and light weapons (SALW) control, transitional justice and mine
action.30 This need is the direct consequence of a broadened understanding of
security, and more specifically of the SSR focus on good governance and people’s
security. In operational terms, this means that SSR requires a wide range of skills
and the adoption of a multidisciplinary approach – SSR measures are unlikely
to succeed if implemented in isolation from other peacebuilding, post-conflict
reconstruction and development programmes.
These three characteristics show that the concept of SSR brings a significant
contribution to the broadening of the concept of security and is consistent with the
human security perspective. Thus human security provides a basis for identifying
common features with mine action and potential synergies. Having reviewed the
evolution of SSR in this subsection, we next analyse the evolution of mine action
to illustrate how it has also moved towards a more holistic response.

Mine action: From humanitarian demining to explosive hazard management
The UN International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) – a set of sector-wide standards
providing guidance, establishing principles and defining requirements designed
to improve safety, efficiency and effectiveness – define mine action as “activities
which aim to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact of mines
and ERW [explosive remnants of war] including unexploded sub-munitions”.31
Consequently, mine action is not only about clearing land, but equally about people
and societies at large and how they are affected32 by landmines33 and ERW,34 with
the ultimate goal of reducing the risks to a level “where people can live safely; in
which economic, social and health development can occur free from the constraints
imposed by landmine and ERW contamination; and in which the victims’ needs
can be addressed”.35 Nowadays, mine action is commonly understood to comprise
five complementary groups of activities or “pillars”:
•• mine/ERW risk education (MRE);
•• demining, i.e. mine/ERW survey, mapping, marking and clearance;
•• victim assistance, including rehabilitation and reintegration;
•• stockpile destruction;
•• advocacy against the use of anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions.36
The origins of mine action can be traced back to 1988, when for the first time
the UN appealed for funds in a humanitarian response to the problems caused
by landmines in Afghanistan. The appeal related to “humanitarian demining”, a
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new term which was understood to mean removal of emplaced mines and also
information and education activities to prevent injuries. The term “humanitarian
demining” was used to denote mine clearance for humanitarian purposes and
distinguish it clearly from the military activity of “breaching”, which cleared
paths through minefields to attain military mission objectives during combat
operations.
The creation of the world’s first international humanitarian mine clearance
NGOs in the late 1980s further accelerated the shift from military to humanitarian
demining. Even more so, the growing importance of commercial demining
companies following the clean-up of Kuwait after the Gulf War in 1991 further
contributed to the affirmation of mine action as a professional civilian activity.37
Today around 40 states and territories have established some form of mine action
programme, while in some other states and territories mine action activities are
overseen by the UN.
Over time, the concept and scope of mine action have widened incrementally.
In its earliest days, it focused on landmines exclusively. It soon became clear
that other forms of explosive hazards and remnants of war (unexploded and
abandoned ordnance) also had to be addressed. A later focus on cluster munitions
as a specifically significant threat resulted in a further modification of the scope
of mine action. The need to develop effective treaties and laws may have both
reflected and driven the dynamic evolution of mine action. A well-defined legal
framework emerged, with three principal instruments of international law:
•• Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), with its Amended
Protocol II and Protocol V;
•• Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC);
•• Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM).
The first treaty addressing contamination by explosive hazards is the UN’s
CCW,38 which forms a framework treaty applicable to situations of armed conflict
containing generic provisions and protocols relating to specific weapons and their
use. It is built upon the customary rules that regulate the conduct of hostilities
contained in international humanitarian law (IHL), including the principle of
distinction between combatants and civilians; proportionality between the choice
of military targets and the intended military objectives; precautions in attacks;
and prohibition of weapons that are of a nature to inflict superfluous injury or
suffering on combatants.39 In 1980 states adopted the framework convention and
its first three protocols.
Protocol II on Landmines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices reflected the state
of customary law at that time by limiting the use of landmines, booby-traps and
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“other devices” and requiring some general measures to be taken to reduce the
dangers to civilians. However, the rules were later shown to provide inadequate
protection to civilians from the effects of anti-personnel mines in particular,
and in 1996 the High Contracting Parties amended the protocol; it now further
regulates but does not ban the use of landmines, booby-traps and other explosive
devices. Under Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, adopted in 2003, states
recognize the serious problems caused by ERW and commit to take remedial
measures and all feasible precautions to minimize their occurrence and impact.
Although the 1996 amendment to CCW Protocol II fell short of prohibiting
landmines, civil society and pro-ban states took advantage of the momentum
generated. They initiated a new process outside the UN framework, which
concluded in a global ban on anti-personnel mines with the adoption of the
APMBC40 in 1997. The convention entered into force in 1999, with the clear
humanitarian goal of putting an end to civilian suffering from anti-personnel
mines. To achieve this, the convention establishes an absolute ban on the
production, use, transfer and stockpiling of anti-personnel mines. In addition,
it requires remedial measures such as the destruction of stockpiles, clearance of
emplaced mines and support to victims. The APMBC has become the backbone
of mine action and, with the inclusion of victim assistance, initiated a groundbreaking normative development. As of January 2016, 162 countries have agreed
to be bound by the APMBC, and many that have not done so do abide by its main
principles and objectives.
In 2006 negotiations on cluster munitions were initiated within the CCW.
In parallel, liked-minded states started a process reminiscent in several aspects
of the negotiations which led to the APMBC.41 This process concluded with the
adoption of the CCM in 2008 and its subsequent entry into force in 2010. The
CCM comprehensively prohibits the production, use, transfer and stockpiling of
cluster munitions, and requires the destruction of stockpiled cluster munitions
and the clearance of their remnants. It also contains detailed provisions on
victim assistance. As of January 2016, a total of 98 states have ratified or acceded
to the CCM.
In addition to the conventions, mine action is regulated by IMAS. Although
not legally binding, they provide guidance to mine action stakeholders and
translate the principles included in IHL treaties, basic human rights and clearance
requirements into practical and detailed norms. IMAS have become the relevant
standards implemented by mine action organizations, and constitute the basis
for national mine action standards. Mine action further relies where relevant
on the 2011 International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG), providing
standards for the management and destruction of ammunition stockpiles, and
the 2012 International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS). These two norms
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reflect the trend in mine action to broaden its support to include ammunition
and SALW.
The various international treaties and standards lay a solid normative
foundation, the extent of which might be missing for SSR. It is demonstrated
below that the international obligations and IMAS provide useful guidance for
the implementation of mine action, for instance in relation to good governance
and the adoption of a human-rights-based approach.
Initially conceived as a humanitarian emergency response, mine action’s
focus was on safely and efficiently removing the threat of mines, cluster
munitions and ERW to meet basic security needs of the civilian population and
humanitarian workers. While this remains a key priority, it has been increasingly
recognized in recent years that explosive legacies of armed conflict also impede
the construction of infrastructure required for economic activity and mobility,
and limit access to resources (e.g. water and land) and social services (e.g. schools
and clinics).
Figure 2: Mine action programme stages42
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Hence, beyond the immediate humanitarian concern, the importance of mine
action for and its broader contribution to a country’s longer-term peacebuilding
and development have enjoyed greater attention. This trend is illustrated
schematically in Figure 2, representing the stylized transition stages of a mine
action programme over time from conflict to stabilization, reconstruction and
longer-term development. Mine action organizations and donors have started to
place an increasing emphasis on ensuring that mine action achieves developmental
outcomes such as access to basic services and improved livelihoods.43
Another evolution of mine action relates to activities which organizations
undertake beyond their traditional mandate. Although there are diverging views
on whether such activities fall within core mine action,44 or if they rather represent
related fields with which mine action organizations increasingly interact, the
trend whereby mine action organizations address broader threats to safety and
security is uncontested.45
Threats to safety and security are globally understood in a wider – and
widening – context, recognizing in part the broad threats of armed violence to
human security. Drawing on their longstanding experience, technical expertise
and capacities in removing and destroying mines and ERW in a wide range of
conflict and post-conflict contexts, mine action organizations have in some cases
evolved towards addressing other instruments of violence, such as SALW and
ammunition, or even towards engaging with the agents of violence.
As conflicts evolve, mine action organizations respond dynamically to
emerging challenges, such as the increased use of improvised explosive devices
(IEDs). As a weapon of choice for non-state armed groups, IEDs are used
against military personnel, peacekeepers and civilians alike. Poorly secured
and inadequately managed ammunition sites can fuel the production of IEDs
and, as the UN Security Council expressed in Resolution 2040 (2012) on Libya,
proliferation of weapons and explosives poses a serious risk to regional and
international security.46 In addition, improperly managed storage areas with
ageing ammunition represent a considerable humanitarian hazard, as testified
by the number of unplanned explosions in depots located in populated areas,
causing widespread damage to people and infrastructure.47
Therefore, mine action operators increasingly engage in physical security
and stockpile management (PSSM) programmes, entailing mainly training in
accounting and munitions handling practices to enhance theft prevention,
deterrence measures, demilitarization and refurbishing or building new storage
depots.48
This ongoing evolution of mine action actors towards addressing wider
security threats related to issues such as IEDs and munition stockpiles is largely
in response to observed needs on the ground and in recognition of increased
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efficiency and effectiveness if the problem is addressed in a more comprehensive
manner. Hence not only has SSR become more holistic, but so have mine action
actors. The following subsection examines how peacekeeping and peacebuilding
relate to a broadened understanding of security, and how their evolution gave rise
to SSR and mine action becoming essential tasks in such contexts.

The evolution of peacekeeping and peacebuilding
SSR and mine action do not take place exclusively in post-conflict countries, but
their definition and evolution are fundamentally connected with the promotion
of peace. For this reason, this subsection shows that the broadening of the modus
operandi of UN peacekeeping and political/peacebuilding missions is instrumental
in identifying existing and potential interactions between SSR and mine action
and grasping the importance of linking them in post-conflict contexts.
UN peacekeeping has evolved since its beginning. Traditional peacekeeping
was a tool for conflict management and relied on three principles: consent
of the parties to the conflict, neutrality and impartiality, and use of force for
self-defence or in defence of the mandate. This approach has been undermined
by the rise of intrastate conflicts and the targeting of civilian populations,
violations of human rights and IHL, and the multiplication of actors involved
in a conflict. Thus traditional peacekeeping has been largely replaced by multidimensional peacekeeping operations that have a wider spectrum of activities,
including facilitation of national political dialogues and reconciliation, protection
of civilians, support to elections, DDR processes and the restoration of the rule
of law.49 In addition, some missions have become more “robust”, as illustrated
by the establishment of the Intervention Brigade within the UN Organization
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).50
According to Ramsbothan et al., this pattern reflects an effort “to expand
the traditional concept of military collective security … into an international
commitment to use military force, where required, ultimately under a UN aegis,
to uphold the wider concept of human security”.51
The broader spectrum of peacekeeping activities provides an overlap between
peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding in the first phases of a peace
process, because multidimensional peacekeeping is supposed to play a “catalytic
role” in favour of peacebuilding (see Figure 3).52
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Figure 3: Linkages and grey areas53

The concept of peacebuilding was defined in the 1992 “Agenda for peace” as a
response to the evolution and limits of traditional peacekeeping as described
above. Boutros-Ghali’s agenda perceived peacebuilding as an action linearly
following conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacekeeping by defining it as an
“action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify
peace to avoid relapse into conflict”.54
Peacebuilding as a concept evolved and was refined during the 1990s to
become better integrated. More than two decades later the UN has initiated
several major reviews of its capacities for conflict prevention and peacebuilding,
and while the implications of these reviews remain as yet unclear, it is likely that a
closer analysis of the linkages between peacebuilding activities will be required.55
Since 2001, the Security Council has understood the aim of peacebuilding as
“preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict and
therefore [it] encompasses a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian
and human rights programmes and mechanisms”.56 Despite its many challenges,
the immediate aftermath of conflict provides unique peacebuilding opportunities
in three mutually reinforcing dimensions:
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•• basic safety and security (such as through mine action, protection of civilians,
DDR, strengthening the rule of law and SSR);
•• socio-economic peace dividends (including the provision of basic services,
economic revitalization and rehabilitation of basic infrastructure and
employment);
•• political reconstruction and processes (including electoral processes, transitional
justice, good governance, basic public administration and promotion of
inclusive dialogue and reconciliation).57
The evolution of peacekeeping and the emergence of peacebuilding came at a time
when the concept of and discourse on human security gained much international
political support. The trends in peacekeeping and peacebuilding as well as the
emergence of the human security approach responded to the same security and
humanitarian challenges and to the changing nature of conflict in the early 1990s.
The thematic and time congruencies clearly suggest that the conceptualization of
and narrative on human security reflected and supported the way in which the
UN rethought its peace operations. Although anecdotal, it is symptomatic that the
former Canadian foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy proposed that building peace
is about building human security.58
Human security is especially relevant to peace operations when bearing
in mind that peacekeeping and special political missions (also referred to as
political/peacebuilding missions in this paper) are more and more required
to link security and development efforts. What is more, a common pattern of
intrastate conflict is the targeting of civilians. The trend underlines a need to focus
on the human impact of conflict and the adequacy of a human security approach
to peacekeeping.59 The question of whether stable peace can be achieved without
ensuring human security at individual and community level is of course, simple
as it might seem, of particular relevance.60
The converging evolution of peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions in
conjunction with the dominant role of the human security concept prompted
the inclusion of SSR and mine action as essential elements in such missions.
While the Security Council had earlier been involved in tasks related to SSR
support and implicitly referred to SSR, it has given peacekeeping and political
missions explicit SSR mandates only since 2004.61 This shift reflects the interconnected nature of SSR, increasingly recognized since the late 1990s in line
with the evolving understanding of peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the sense
that political, economic, legal, social and security sector reforms have to be
undertaken holistically to meet the security needs of individuals and communities
in post-conflict peace operations.62
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Similarly, mine action components have been introduced in many peacekeeping
missions.63 More explicitly, the UN Security Council noted in 2003 the importance
of addressing mine action in mandates for peacekeeping operations.64 That same
year, through restructuring its mine action coordination center, the UN Mission
in Ethiopia and Eritrea became effectively the first peacekeeping mission to
incorporate an integrated civilian and military mine action headquarters in the
mission structure.65 A review of current mandates is provided in the third section
of this paper.
As for other peacebuilding activities, SSR and mine action support the
prevention of violent conflict and peacebuilding in its three dimensions listed
above. Their contribution to basic safety and security may be the most visible.66
Mine action seeks to provide physical safety, for example through clearance of
contaminated areas or the reduction of stockpiled weapons and ammunition.67
SSR aims to ensure that security provision is locally owned, accountable and
effective, thereby contributing to building confidence in and strengthening state
institutions, as well as to enhancing the rule of law and the security apparatus
protecting the population.
The contribution of SSR and mine action to peacebuilding also entails
dividends for socio-economic development. Addressing the various peacebuilding
dimensions simultaneously and in a balanced way is a challenge in post-conflict
peacebuilding, but a necessity, since it is widely admitted that “there can be
no peace without development, no development without peace, and no lasting
peace or sustainable development without respect for human rights and the
rule of law”.68 Thus it is often argued that an appropriately sized, accountable
and well-governed security sector contributes to an environment less prone to
violence, thereby improving both security and sustainable economic and human
development.69 This refers to an even broader and demonstrated link that
governance and effectiveness not only foster development but at the same time
reduce the potential for conflict.70
Interestingly, the debate on SSR in the early 1990s started among development
donors looking at ways to improve the effectiveness of development aid. The
positive effects of SSR in terms of improved safety of people and property, a shift
of expenditures from military to development, conflict prevention and wider
participation in decision-making on security provision came up very prominently
in the discussions.71 However, the concrete developmental impact of SSR is subject
to controversy. While it is assumed that the above objectives are at the core of SSR,
it is less obvious that SSR has thus far been programmed with development goals
in mind.72 In post-conflict situations it is apparent that SSR’s security mandate
has been more vigorously pursued than its development dividends.73
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The contribution of mine action to development is more obvious. Contamination
by or fear of ERW leads to human displacement, delays the return and resettlement
of refugees and internally displaced persons, and blocks access to vital resources
and social services.74 In response to the recognition of this clear interconnectedness, mine action organizations and their donors started to place increasing
emphasis on the “security–development nexus” and integrate mine action into
broader national development plans.75
Finally, some scholars and practitioners point to the primacy of the
political aspect of peacebuilding,76 which SSR supports very directly. It is more
difficult to demonstrate mine action’s contribution to the political dimension
of peacebuilding, especially given the fact that in most instances traditional
mine action has a humanitarian vocation. What is uncontested, however, is that
mine action can play a key role in confidence building among warring parties,
including through sharing information about minefields and conducting joint
demining projects. This may serve as a foundation for conflict resolution or inject
valuable confidence in the peace process with spin-off effects on reconciliation.
With populations seeing enemies or former parties to the conflict clearing and
removing the explosive hazards affecting them, confidence can be built or rebuilt.
To sum up, SSR and mine action evolved from a narrow set of activities
to more comprehensive action, and this evolution is grounded in a changing
understanding of security. Also, the emergence of the human security concept
is reflected in the evolution from traditional to multidimensional peacekeeping
and the growing emphasis on integrated peacebuilding. This contributed to
the explicit conceptual inclusion of SSR and mine action in such missions. An
understanding of this broadened perspective on security proves essential to
examining the conceptual commonalities between SSR and mine action, which
are the focus of the following section.
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SSR and Mine Action:
Common Approaches
The previous section describes the general pattern of the broadening understanding
of the concept of security beyond the sole security of the state. This change is
related to the development of the concept of human security and reflected in how
SSR, mine action and peacekeeping/building operations are defined today. This
section takes a step further by showing that SSR and mine action not only share
the same understanding of security, but also have strong similarities in the way
programmes should be designed and implemented.
In particular, this section examines in greater depth approaches common
to both SSR and mine action, and scrutinizes how these commonalities are
articulated conceptually. This analysis prepares the ground for the third section,
in which these conceptual linkages are tested against the operational realities.
We identify national ownership and capacity development, good governance
and a people-centred focus and human rights as shared approaches given their
cross-cutting nature and relevance to SSR and mine action. They further reflect
some of the founding elements of human security as defined in the first section.

National ownership and capacity development
SSR and mine action are steered by the assumption that concerned states bear
the ultimate responsibility for both processes. There is recognition that for
SSR and mine action to be successful and sustainable, national ownership77
is sine qua non and commitment by national leadership indispensable.78
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The legal-normative framework governing mine action is helpful in this regard,
as it makes state responsibility a legal obligation. For instance, the APMBC
and CCM confer responsibility on concerned states very explicitly, noting their
obligation to destroy stockpiles and clear the territory under their jurisdiction
or control. Likewise, IMAS enshrine this principle, stipulating that the primary
responsibility is vested in the government of the mine-affected state.79
The importance of national ownership is also key for SSR. United Nations
Security Council Resolution 2151(2014) “reiterates the centrality” of national
ownership of SSR and “the responsibility of the country concerned in the
determination of security sector reform assistance”.80 Yet because SSR targets
the reorganization of political power structures and authority, SSR might be
an endeavour with greater political implications than mine action. National
ownership of SSR might thus be more sensitive, since it involves issues related to
accountability and control. Hence, given such implications, national motivations
for reform may not always align with the good governance principles promoted
by SSR processes. What is more, aid providers could fear that their support to the
security sector might be misused to commit human rights violations.81
Armed conflict generally leads to a lack of governance institutions or weak
and even illegitimate structures. In this context, national ownership might be
illusory in an early phase and external assistance is usually provided to ensure
the delivery of the most critical peacekeeping and peacebuilding tasks, including
SSR and mine action. While some authors caution the risk of aid dependency
potentially leading to reduced efforts of recipient countries to help themselves
and an inherent tension between externally induced, funded and supported
initiatives and national ownership, such an institutional vacuum also provides
excellent opportunities for setting up effective and accountable structures and
building the necessary capacities from the outset.82
It is often noted that a precise definition of national ownership in SSR
contexts is challenging, due to the very different environments in which SSR is
undertaken and the varying “stages” at which reforming states find themselves,
especially post-conflict. In the same vein, the level of support needed by affected
states in mine action is uneven: some programmes only require limited external
assistance, building on solid national know-how and institutions, while others
request more profound support. Leaning on Nathan’s conceptualization, the
objective of national ownership might in both cases be that the mine action
programme or the reform of security policies, institutions and projects is
designed, managed and implemented by domestic, not external, actors.83
With the involvement of international stakeholders such as the UN,
international or regional organizations and NGOs at the early stage of post-conflict
recovery, the issue of transitioning responsibilities to national entities is therefore
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a critical, although delicate, process. In mine action this role is generally
assumed by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), which manages temporarily
– sometimes for years – a national programme while striving to accelerate the
transfer of responsibilities to national actors at an appropriate time.84 However,
transition has to be well timed so as to ensure that the capacities, institutions and
structures are in place and sustainable. Transition can only take place and responsibilities be assumed if there is a progressive “handover” process “through which
the international community reduces its financial and technical support, as the
affected state develops the required national programme management capacities
that lead to national ownership. Successful transition will only occur when these
parallel components have been reasonably effective.”85
This definition entails building and developing national capacities to ensure
that they are capable, empowered and adequately equipped to assume ownership.
In post-conflict environments, however, the development of national capacities is
often addressed as part of exit strategies of international interventions, whereas it
should be an integral part thereof immediately at the outset. Both SSR and mine
action actors face this challenge. This concern becomes particularly striking when
keeping in mind that “inattention to capacity development constrains national
actors from taking ownership of their recovery and limits accountability between
the State and its people”.86
In mine action in particular, experience illustrates that it can be challenging
to accommodate donor preferences for home-grown organizations and in-kind
contributions, since this external support might not be the most appropriate in
a given environment.87 In the same vein, Donais stresses a different, but related,
challenge in SSR – equally relevant to mine action – with regards to political will
from donors. Putting the concept of national ownership into practice requires
donors to cede parts of the control and authority they usually tend to exert and
accept a higher level of uncertainty.88 The issue of the willingness of donor states
to lose part of their sovereignty over aid provision is, however, a more systemic
challenge which also emerges in broader debates on donor coordination and aid
effectiveness.89

Good governance: Transparency, accountability and effectiveness
Another conceptual commonality between SSR and mine action relates to good
governance. Good governance has been interpreted by development donors as a
concept aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of public services.
It is widely understood to be composed of three key pillars: accountability;
transparency, interpreted as freely available information, therefore representing a
precondition for accountability and sound decision-making; and participation of
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citizens, either directly or through legitimate intermediaries such as parliamentary
representatives.90
SSR seeks to apply the principles of good governance to the security sector
to ensure that individuals and societies feel safer through more effective and
accountable security provision. In this context, it is critical that security institutions
work under civilian control and the rule of law, since the absence of accountability,
resulting in an environment where security institutions can act with impunity,
may often lead to political interference and human rights violations. The absence
of accountability puts human security at risk.91 In turn, SSR favours security
institutions under civilian oversight and democratic governance, gives people a
participative voice in the decision-making process regarding security institutions
and promotes a legitimate, transparent and inclusive state which is accountable
to its citizens. SSR therefore has a substantive role to play in consolidating
democracy and promoting human rights.92 Indeed, rights holders are not simply
reliant on the good will of the state to deliver rights, but should participate actively
in developing and implementing policies that provide for those rights.93
However, “providing both security and democratic governance is not an easy
challenge to meet”.94 Particularly in post-conflict peacebuilding, it is of utmost
importance to enhance good governance in the security sector, even though
a common error in programming usually gives less priority to the promotion
of transparency and democratic accountability than to training and equipping
security forces.95
The three key good governance pillars also apply to humanitarian demining.
Since mine action re-establishes access to vital resources, prioritization of tasks
is an essential element of these programmes. During such processes a number
of aspects have to be taken into account, such as land rights, political and social
considerations and development perspectives. With a view to not doing harm
nor creating or refuelling tensions, a legitimate, participatory and transparent
process is required which will ultimately enhance good governance and ensure
the enjoyment of human rights.96 The importance of participation in strategic
planning is also essential to this goal as stressed in a recent study on this issue.97
This clearly reflects the wider recognition that active participation from the
population is the basis for any successful peace process. Furthermore, dialogue
on security issues should be carried out with a gender and diversity perspective,
as security might be perceived differently by women, girls, boys and men, as well
as minority groups.98 Broad participation fosters ownership and the inclusion of
local context and specificities.
Mine action is often among the first internationally supported mechanisms
in post-conflict environments. As such, it is a good entry point to promote good
governance, with considerable spin-off effects on further structures in the security
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sector established at a later stage. There can be a time lapse between SSR and
mine action given the different phases of conflict when they begin, which can
lead to some difficulties in linking the two sets of activities.99 Yet the potential for
mine action to influence broader governance practices is still recognized.100
Although each operational environment is different and a context-specific
needs assessment is required, mine action may be more straightforward in
terms of the possible institutional architecture than SSR. IMAS provide guidance
on governance for regulating, managing and coordinating mine action, so the
necessary institutions are put in place for states to assume ownership. IMAS
generally suggest a division of responsibilities between a mostly interministerial national mine action authority in charge of policy, regulation and the overall
management of mine action programmes and a national mine action centre that
has essentially an executive role.101 An example of a recommended national mine
action structure is set out in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Mine action institutions102
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An unequivocal and transparent institutional architecture with clear responsibilities, checks and balances is a precondition for institutions to be accountable. The
set-up of institutions rests upon legal instruments, mostly national legislation,
preceded by a political process involving government, parliament and agencies
and offering excellent opportunities for inclusive participation. Ultimately, this
kind of legislation is the source of legitimacy for mine action institutions and
programmes. Accountability is further ensured in the sense that national mine
action authorities generally report to parliaments.103
On a cautionary note, Bryden stipulates that the set-up of internationally
funded mine action capacities may also lead to corruption and self-interest,
hence it is important to streamline parallel efforts to increase effectiveness within
oversight mechanisms.104 The development of mine action institutions is a good
example of potentially fruitful synergies between SSR and mine action. SSR
could – or should – provide an analytical framework and expertise helping to
understand the overall institutional security architecture and political dimension
of mine action, as well as to identify critical issues and design possible solutions.
Finally, transparency is key for mine action to serve as a confidence builder
between formerly warring parties. In this context, the legal framework governing
mine action comes into play and contributes to transparency and to the exchange
of information. Both the APMBC and the CCM require States Parties to submit
so-called transparency reports, initially at the moment of joining the conventions,
and subsequently on an annual basis.105
Good governance and its three pillars are intended to improve efficiency and
effectiveness. In concrete terms, being effective means for the security sector to
meet the security and justice needs of the state and its population and for mine
action to provide a safe and secure environment and access to livelihoods. IMAS
again prove valuable. They establish a frame of reference and concrete advice
on each component of humanitarian demining, with a view to improving the
safety, efficiency and effectiveness of programmes and the sector overall. At the
core of such an endeavour is the protection of those most at risk and it is this
fundamental commitment to a people-centred approach that IMAS and mine
action share with SSR and which connects both to human security.

People-centred approach and human rights
Besides their ties to development and ensuring freedom from want, both SSR
and mine action serve as a catalytic tool for the promotion of human rights and a
life of dignity – another key element of human security. This subsection therefore
scrutinizes how SSR and mine action follow a people-centred approach and
support respect for human rights, including equality.
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The link between SSR and human rights is of particular importance and relevance
due to the fact that SSR mostly takes place in countries in which the security
sector may have been a major threat to the human rights of their people and
protectors have become perpetrators of human rights abuses. In the aftermath of
conflict, security stakeholders can be feared and mistrusted by the population in
an environment of impunity in which security forces are not held accountable.
Despite these circumstances, the state bears the principal responsibility for
international obligations such as human rights law. In addition to stopping
direct violations of human rights, the state is required to create an environment
conducive to the enjoyment of internationally agreed human rights by its people.
Since the traditional security sector plays a central role in ensuring the protection
of such rights, a post-conflict state cannot simply rely on a historically abusive
security sector. To do nothing in such circumstances may be considered as an
omission, and hence a wrongful act.106
At a policy level the linkages are clearly outlined, such as in the OECD-DAC
SSR handbook where the strengthening of respect for human rights is considered
to be a key principle of SSR.107 It is less clear, though, what exactly a state is
required to do under international law in relation to reforming its security sector,
and not much analysis is available on how SSR programming should actually be
informed by human rights in terms of legal duty. International law does, however,
provide principles to steer SSR work: the duty to respect and ensure human rights
must entail due diligence to analyse patterns of abuse; states must investigate
gross violations of human rights law and serious violations of IHL and prosecute
perpetrators; and states must ensure that the victims’ rights are guaranteed. These
obligations underline the centrality of human rights training and vetting, among
others, and should clarify the objectives of SSR programming.108 In the same
vein, a human rights approach emphasizes the relationship between the rights
holders and the duty-bearer, while trying to adjust institutions or laws to make
sure that the duty-bearer – the state – actually fulfils its obligations. According
to Galletti and Wodzicki, this could mean in practice that SSR may need to shift
from a state-capacity paradigm to a state-obligation paradigm.109
In the context of UN peace operations, missions are required to apply the
UN’s Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, which “sets out measures that all
United Nations entities must take in order to ensure that any support that they
may provide to non-United Nations forces is consistent with the purposes and
principles as set out in the Charter of the United Nations and with its responsibility to respect, promote and encourage respect for international humanitarian,
human rights and refugee law.”110 The due diligence policy requires UN entities
to assess whether security forces receiving support are already engaged in or are
likely to commit grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights or
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refugee law; and, where this may be the case to work with relevant authorities to
stop the abuses or ultimately end support. Applying the due diligence policy has
provided an initial basis for a human-rights approach to SSR in the context of UN
support even if much remains to be improved in this area.
The importance of a comprehensive approach to SSR in relation to human
rights might be best illustrated by the 2012 report of the Special Rapporteur of
the Human Rights Council on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and
guarantees of non-recurrence in the context of transitional justice. Accordingly,
transitional justice should, for instance, include institutional reform or vetting of
office holders with a view to ensuring non-recurrence of human rights violations.111
This demonstrates the direct contribution of SSR to the respect for and promotion
of human rights and the need for these linkages to be institutionalized, as proposed
by the Special Rapporteur. In fact, should abusive security officials not be held
accountable and simply recycled into reformed security forces as part of SSR and/
or DDR processes, the right to reparations and the state’s duty to ensure respect
of international rights can hardly be upheld, while the legitimacy of the security
sector – paramount for its effectiveness – continues to be eroded. According to
some scholars, though, while the importance of human rights training and
vetting is recognized in SSR at policy level, they are not necessarily understood as
being driven by international legal obligations.112 Hence, as Galletti and Wodzicki
articulate it, “by shifting the paradigm of SSR to a human rights perspective, SSR
becomes part of the process to secure human rights”.113
Good governance and transparency are also critical to ensure economic and
social rights. Excessive military budgets can draw badly needed resources away
from humanitarian or development projects and may impede a state in realizing
internationally protected rights. By promoting civilian control and transparency
within the security sector, SSR can prevent or counteract such situations.
Economic and social rights can also be violated directly by security forces, for
instance through corruption. SSR again plays a determinant role in creating an
environment in which the state can address effectively questions of corruption or
other forms of economic violence.114 It is therefore essential that a human rights
framework focuses on accountability, without which laws are powerless. This is
certainly as valid for SSR as it is for mine action.
Mine action follows a human-rights-based approach, given that mines and
ERW can directly affect the exercise of a number of political, economic, social,
civil and cultural rights. Without being exhaustive, these include the right to life
and security of a person, the right to an adequate standard of living and the right
to education, all enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The
relevance of mine action to respect for the right to food can be exemplified by the
report of the Special Rapporteur on food after his mission to Lebanon in 2006,
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which demonstrates how mine/ERW contamination can severely decrease the
ability of affected populations to feed themselves through an adequate livelihood.115
Mine action and the removal of contamination by mines and ERW may also
drastically improve the enjoyment of the freedom of movement.116 Hence any
concrete mine action project on the ground contributes to re-establishing the
exercise of an array of internationally guaranteed rights. A founding principle
for the development of IMAS consisted in protecting those most at risk, which
underscores the strong people-centred – and consequently human security –
focus of mine action.
In this context, assistance to victims merits particular emphasis. The first
section of this paper redrew the evolution of mine action and the international
legal framework surrounding it; within this, the rights of persons with disabilities,
in particular victims,117 have gained increasing attention, not least because of the
landmark provisions of the APMBC.118 For the first time, legal obligations to
assist victims of a particular weapons system were included in an international
instrument governing conventional weapons.119 It also expanded the traditional
understanding of state responsibility, with states accepting that they have
important human security and human rights responsibilities.120
The CCW’s Protocol V and the CCM subsequently embodied similar
provisions, with the CCM especially going beyond the APMBC requirements.121
Since the ultimate objective is to achieve the full and effective participation of
victims in society on an equal basis with others, this requires the integration
of victim assistance into broader contexts such as disability rights, health and
employment.122 In this regard, the entry into force of the UN Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities further boosted the attention given to victims
by clarifying states’ obligation to ensure the equal enjoyment of human rights
by persons with disabilities. As such, mine action serves in the application and
promotion of human rights instruments.
Especially the APMBC and the CCM provide a useful framework and guidance
for the concrete implementation of human-rights-based assistance to victims.
Beyond the obligations they contain, five-year action plans go into much more
detail about actions required by States Parties. Not only do such plans ensure
progress in victim assistance, but each review conference at which the international
community takes stock of achievements also helps demonstrate the realism
of state responsibility for victims.123 As an example, the APMBC States Parties
committed in the 2014–2019 Maputo Action Plan to communicate “time-bound
and measurable objectives [they seek] to achieve through the implementation of
national policies, plans and legal frameworks that will tangibly contribute, to the
full, equal and effective participation of mine victims in society”.124
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Therefore, while both SSR and mine action have adopted a human-rights-based
approach which could still be strengthened, mine action – unlike SSR – can
rely on international legal norms and agreed actions which have embraced this
approach. Yet despite this difference in the development of international legal
frameworks, both sectors adhere to the principle that a human rights framework
helps to secure freedoms and human development and to empower people to take
part in the decisions that will affect their lives.
For empowerment of people to be truly meaningful, the participation and
inclusion of the society in its entirety on an equal basis and without discrimination is a precondition. Gender and diversity are therefore relevant to SSR and mine
action. In his first report on SSR, the UN Secretary-General stressed that a gender
approach “is key to developing security sector institutions that are non-discriminatory, representative of the population and capable of effectively responding to
the specific security needs of diverse groups”.125 This is based on the recognition
that women, girls, boys and men as well as minority groups experience security
and insecurity in different ways. Likewise, the OECD-DAC SSR handbook
underscores that the comprehensive integration of gender equality dimensions
into SSR is of central importance to ensure local ownership, oversight, accountability and not least effective provision of security.126
Improved inclusion of women and marginalized groups can be supported,
for example, by their participation in SSR planning or through structural reforms
targeting personnel practices (e.g. recruitment).127 Inclusive security sector
institutions, which represent the diversity of societies at large are more likely to be
trusted and perceived as legitimate, as well as more effective in their mission but
these benefits require the security forces be appropriately diverse and representative in their composition.128 The need to develop gender- and identity- specific
indicators and to collect disaggregated data is thus given high priority in SSR.
On the mine action side, as for SSR, elements such as inclusive planning,
recruitment practices and collecting and analysing disaggregated data are
cross-cutting and, as for SSR, conducive to improved effectiveness in programmes.
It is therefore not surprising that the well-developed legal-normative framework in
mine action provides a powerful awareness of gender and diversity requirements.
Indeed, a gender and diversity lens has been embedded in, for instance, the
CCM and the Maputo Action Plan, and emphasizes the need for gender-sensitive clearance, MRE and victim assistance.129 Furthermore, IMAS specify more
detailed requirements for a gender and diversity perspective in all aspects of mine
action, including planning, implementation and monitoring.
Concretely, disaggregation of information by identity categories, including
gender and age, enhances the prioritization and planning of mine action work
and allows activities, including MRE, to be tailored according to gender-specific
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exposure to risk and mobility patterns.130 Moreover, as in SSR, employment and
training opportunities in mine action should be provided to women and men
without discrimination. In many cultures it is not appropriate for women to
interact with men outside their immediate families. Having women and men
working in survey teams (tasked with collecting information from affected
communities regarding the location of mines/ERW), for example, is essential,
since it enables them to access and reach out to affected women and girls and make
information-gathering processes more effective. This enhances the effectiveness,
accountability and responsiveness of mine action and the same principles also
apply to the work of the security sector more broadly.
Armed conflict can both catalyse change in gender norms and entrench
discrimination. Ultimately, both SSR and mine action strive to change mentalities
and institutional cultures, promoting equality and ensuring that entrenched
discrimination is not perpetuated in a post-conflict environment or a reformed
security sector.131 SSR and mine action can be inclusive and effective only when
meeting the differing security needs of all people. There are clear gender- and diversity-related linkages between SSR and mine action, as the key principles of gender
mainstreaming and equal participation of all social groups apply to both fields.
In sum, this section shows that some of the foundational elements of human
security as defined in the first section are translated into principles that shape
the SSR and mine action approaches to programme design and implementation.
In particular, there are strong conceptual commonalities between SSR and mine
action related to national ownership and capacity development, good governance,
a people-centred focus and human rights. These cross-cutting approaches
provide for substantive overlap between how SSR and mine action are conceptualized. Because of these overlaps it could be expected that linking SSR and mine
action in operational terms would offer enhanced opportunities to improve good
governance, protect human rights and provide for human security. Yet to date,
mine action and SSR have developed as discrete areas of operational and policy
interest with relatively few efforts made to operationalize the conceptual linkages
between the two agendas. The following section examines to what extent these
conceptual linkages are reflected in operational terms and what might be gained
from drawing them closer together.

32

Ursign Hofmann, Gianluca Maspoli, Åsa Massleberg and Pascal Rapillard

Operationalizing Linkages
between SSR and Mine
Action
This section examines whether the conceptual commonalities between SSR and
mine action so far discussed are operationalized in the field. It first looks at UN
peacekeeping and political/peacebuilding missions, as they play a critical role in
conducting SSR and mine action in post-conflict environments. In particular, it
enquires how frequently SSR and mine action are in the mandates of these missions
and whether there is a significant connection between them. Subsequently, the
section broadens its perspective by considering examples of SSR and mine action
beyond UN missions, because bilateral programmes implemented by states or
NGOs also play an important role in post-conflict peacebuilding and may provide
further evidence of how the conceptual commonalities between the two fields are
translated into practice.

SSR and mine action in the mandates of UN peacekeeping missions
As shown in the first section, UN peacekeeping missions have become integrated
and multidimensional and play a “catalytic role” in favour of important
peacebuilding activities, including SSR and mine action. As of August 2015, a
review of the current peacekeeping and special political missions132 shows that out
of 25 missions, 14 mandates contain tasks related to SSR, eight are peacekeeping
missions and six are political/peacebuilding missions. Among the 25 missions,
14 also have an explicit or implicit133 reference to mine action activities in their
mandates. Finally, ten missions have tasks in both SSR and mine action.
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Table 1: Overview of peacekeeping and political/peacebuilding missions134
Number
of missions

Chapter
VI UN
Charter

Chapter
VII UN
Charter

SSR
explicit

SSR
implicit

Mine
action
explicit

Mine
action
implicit

SSR and
mine
action

Peacekeeping
missions

16

6

10

6

2

7

4

7

Special
political/
peacebuilding
missions

9

0

2

4

2

2

1

3

Total

25

6

12

10

4

9

5

10

These figures substantiate the claim that the conceptual overlaps between SSR and
mine action translate directly into operational contexts. Closer examination reveals
the concrete issues on which SSR and mine action do—and do not—interact.
Starting with the peacekeeping missions, eight have a mandate in SSR and
all are stabilization missions (see Table 2). Six have explicit tasks in SSR that
consist mainly of assisting the re-establishment and/or strengthening of a state’s
institutions through advice and coordination of other international efforts in
SSR. Often, SSR activities are related to a peace agreement, which provides the
objective of the reforms and the specific security sector components that have
to be reformed. For instance, the UN Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is tasked
to “support the implementation of the defence and security measures of the
Agreement [on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali] … and to coordinate international
efforts … to rebuild the Malian security sector, within the framework set out by
the Agreement”.135
In our view, the list of peacekeeping missions encompassing SSR in their
mandates includes two other missions – UNMIK (UN Mission in Kosovo) and
UNAMID (African Union/UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur) – since their mandates
refer to tasks that are related implicitly to one or more components of an SSR
process. UNMIK has to provide an interim and transitional administration
“while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic
self-governing institutions”.136 In addition, it is tasked to promote, organize and
oversee the development of provisional democratic institutions and, pending a
final settlement on the status of Kosovo, it is in charge of civil order, including
establishing the local police.137 Concerning UNAMID, its second strategic priority
consists of mediating between the government of Sudan and armed groups based
on the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur,138 and the mission is encouraged
to “engage fully in support of the implementation” of this document,139 which
includes measures for the reform of the justice and military institutions.140
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Table 2: UN peacekeeping missions141
Chapter
VI UN
Charter

Chapter
VII UN
Charter

SSR
explicit

SSR
implicit

Mine
action
explicit

Mine
action
implicit

SSR and
mine
action

MINUSCA
UN Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission
in the Central African Republic

–

X

X

–

–

X

X

MINUSMA
UN Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission
in Mali

–

X

X

–

X

–

X

MINUSTAH
UN Stabilization Mission in
Haiti

–

X

X

–

–

–

–

MONUSCO
UN Organization Stabilization
Mission in the DRC

–

X

X

–

X

–

X

UNAMID
AU/UN Hybrid Operation in
Darfur

–

X

–

X

X

–

X

UNMIK
UN Mission in Kosovo

–

X

–

X

X

–

X

UNISFA
UN Interim Security Force for
Abyei

–

X

–

–

X142

–

–

UNMIL
UN Mission in Liberia

–

X

X

–

–

X

X

UNMISS
UN Mission in the Republic of
South Sudan

–

X

–

–

X143

–

–

UNOCI
UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire

–

X

X

–

–

X

X

MINURSO
UN Mission for the Referendum
in Western Sahara

X

–

–

–

X144

–

–

UNDOF
UN Disengagement Observer
Force

X

–

–

–

–

–

–

UNFICYP
UN Peacekeeping Force in
Cyprus

X

–

–

–

–

–

–

UNIFIL
UN Interim Force in Lebanon

X

–

–

–

–

X145

–

UNMOGIP
UN Military Observer Group in
India and Pakistan

X

–

–

–

–

–

–

UNTSO
UN Truce Supervision
Organization

X

–

–

–

–

–

–

Total

6

10

6

2

7

4

7
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Among these eight peacekeeping missions, seven do also have tasks in mine
action. Four of them (MINUSMA, MONUSCO, UNAMID and UNMIK) have in
their mandates tasks related to core mine action activities. Three other missions
can be considered as implicitly related to mine action (MINUSCA, UNMIL and
UNOCI) because they support mine action actors in achieving their objectives
and/or encompass activities in PSSM.
•• MINUSMA’s mandate refers to mine action under the task of protection of
civilians, and has to “assist the Malian authorities with the removal and
destruction of mines and other explosive devices and weapons and ammunition
management”.146
•• MONUSCO is tasked to “mitigate the risk to civilians before, during and after
any military operation”.147 These risks include ERW, and UNMAS provides
MRE, risk assessment and clearance. In addition, UNMAS provides support
to stabilization by building capacities of national institutions to deal with
contamination, collecting and destroying weapons during the DDR process and
providing support to overall SALW management. Finally, in relation to the Peace,
Security and Cooperation Framework, UNMAS supports national ownership by
establishing weapons and ammunition depots and training security personnel
in safe management.148
•• UNAMID integrates mine action under the task of protection of civilians
and facilitates the delivery of humanitarian assistance, which constitutes the
mission’s second strategic priority. The threat to civilians posed by unexploded
ordnance is an indicator of this strategic priority.149
•• UNMIK’s mandate includes the task of “supervising demining until the
international presence can, as appropriate, take over responsibility”.150
•• MINUSCA has to “seize and collect arms and any related material the transfer
of which into the CAR [Central African Republic] violates the measures imposed
by paragraph 54 of resolution 2127 and to record and dispose of such arms
and related materiel as appropriate”.151 The mandate also calls on national and
international stakeholders to coordinate with MINUSCA in ensuring “safe
and effective management, storage and security of stockpiles of small arms
and light weapons, and the collection and/or destruction of surplus, seized,
unmarked, or illicitly held weapons and ammunition”, and “further stresses the
importance of incorporating such elements into SSR and DDR programmes”.152
•• UNMIL is mandated to collect and destroy arms and ammunition within the
DDR programme.153 This task is part of the support provided to the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, and includes the establishment of security
conditions for humanitarian assistance.
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•• Finally, UNOCI’s mandate requests the mission to assist the government
of Côte d’Ivoire in “collecting and storing arms and registering all relevant
information related to those arms”.154 To fulfil this task, the mandate calls on the
government to give the mission access to stores of “all weapons, ammunition
and related materiel of all armed security forces”.155 This request is related to the
effective management of arms and ammunition, which plays an important role
in the stabilization of the country in conjunction with SSR and DDR.156 Mine
action involvement in these activities is confirmed by UNMAS, which provides
assistance to UNOCI in the field of protection of civilians, DDR and the reform
of the country’s security institutions.157
The review of peacekeeping missions’ mandates shows that mine action and
SSR are regularly related to the protection of civilians, establishment of a secure
environment for delivering humanitarian assistance and DDR.158 It also confirms
the increasing importance of PSSM in relation to DDR processes. Of particular
interest is MINUSCA’s mandate, because it clearly emphasizes the need to connect
PSSM with the SSR programme – a connection we also find in MONUSCO and
UNOCI, and which testifies to a growing awareness of the need to address PSSM
as a governance issue.
However, we are of the opinion that linkages remain limited between SSR
and mine action for three reasons. First, mine action is mostly included in
the mandates under the task of protection of civilians and providing a secure
environment for delivering humanitarian assistance, and there is no significant
linkage with the establishment of mine action institutions, which is a governance
issue and is related to effectiveness and accountability. Second, mine action and
SSR are mainly connected through PSSM activities and do not include some core
mine action activities (MRE and victim assistance). Third, the linkage through
human rights issues, which are related to mine action through the conventions,
is absent despite the fact that they potentially support the promotion of justice
and accountability. The general impression is that SSR and mine action are rather
conducted in parallel, and there is no use of the entire spectrum of possible joint
activities.
The assessment of the linkages between SSR and mine action requires
looking at political/peacebuilding missions, which have expanded since the end
of the Cold War. There are nine political/peacebuilding missions, and six have
in their mandates activities explicitly or implicitly related to SSR. Of these six
missions, three (UNAMA, UNSOM and UNSMIL) have in their mandates an
explicit or implicit task in mine action.
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Table 3: UN special political/peacebuilding missions159
Chapter
VI UN
Charter
UNAMA
UN Assistance Mission
in Afghanistan
UNAMI
UN Assistance Mission
for Iraq
UNIOGBIS
UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in
Guinea–Bissau
UNOCA
UN Regional Office for
Central Africa
UNOWA
UN Office of the Special
Representative of the
Secretary –General for
West Africa
UNRCCA
UN Regional Centre for
Preventive Diplomacy for
Central Asia
UNSCOL
Office of the UN Special
Coordinator for Lebanon
UNSMIL
UN Support Mission
in Libya
UNSOM
UN Assistance Mission
in Somalia
Total

Chapter
VII UN
Charter

SSR
explicit

SSR
implicit

Mine
action
explicit

Mine
action
implicit

SSR and
mine
action

–

–

X

–

–

X160

X

–

–

–

X161

–

–

–

–

–

X

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

X

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

X

–

X162

X

–

X

–

X163

X

–

X

–

X

0

2

4

2

2

1

3

•• UNAMA is mandated to support the Afghan government in taking full
“leadership and ownership in security governance”.164 Concerning mine action,
the mission’s role is expressed through the monitoring and coordination of
activities in the protection of civilians and the coordination of all UN agencies
and programmes, including those supporting mine action.165
•• UNSOM is tasked to support the federal government of Somalia and the
African Union Mission in Somalia with strategic policy advice on “security
sector reform, rule of law (including police, justice and corrections within
the framework of the United Nations Global Focal Point), disengagement of
combatants, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, maritime security
and mine action”.166
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•• UNSMIL provides “support to key Libyan institutions”167 and continues its
efforts in defence and police by “engaging national security forces and armed
groups to encourage their participation in the dialogue process, and in ongoing
preparatory work on new security arrangements”.168 UNSMIL also “continues
to convene regular international coordination meetings on Libyan defence
sector reform in Tunis”.169 In mine action, UNSMIL contributes to “securing
uncontrolled arms and related material and countering its proliferation”170 and
implements measures of Resolution 2144 (2014), including to control “arms and
related materiel in Libya and counter their proliferation, by working to arrange
access, ensure proper management, safe storage and, where appropriate,
effective disposal of arms and related materiel, [and] to support coherent partner
effort in this regard, including coordination and facilitation of international
assistance”.171
These figures confirm the important role that SSR plays in peacebuilding and
its political nature. Concerning mine action, missions’ tasks are focused on
protection of civilians and control, storage and disposal of arms and ammunition,
and promoting a broader view of mine action by including activities such as PSSM.
However, as for the peacekeeping missions, political/peacebuilding missions
provide a limited linkage between SSR and mine action.
Overall, out of 25 peacekeeping and political/peacebuilding missions, ten
have SSR and mine action in their mandates, but SSR and mine action seem to
be conducted in parallel and follow a “division of labour” instead of operating
jointly. The overlap occurs mainly in relation to PSSM, as shown by the mandates
of MINUSCA, MONUSCO, UNOCI and UNSMIL. These missions seem to be
the only ones suggesting a stronger connection between SSR and mine action
to promote stabilization of the country. MINUSCA’s mandate speaks directly
of “incorporating” PSSM in SSR; MONUSCO relies on UNMAS for support in
capacity building that should help stabilization and national ownership; and finally
UNSOM is tasked to provide “strategic advice” in both SSR and mine action.
This paper does not propose that mine action should be merged with SSR.
Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that in the mandates the linkages are limited,
as there is no indication of possible connections at the level of normative and
governance dimensions. Ultimately, the mandates do not reflect the potential
synergies that were identified in the previous sections and would be beneficial for
both SSR and mine action172 and the achievement of missions’ goals.
In addition, a better use of potential synergies would support missions in
addressing the challenges identified by the 2013 UN Secretary-General’s report
on SSR. This report says that despite the progress made, SSR still needs to go
beyond a “pillar approach” and undertake “sector-wide interventions”.173 It also
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highlights that SSR faces the challenge of contributing to long-term security
through reforms and at the same time to “immediate security delivery through,
for example, community-oriented policing, justice delivery and small arms and
light weapons control”.174 Finally, the report underscores that SSR needs “to be
linked to a broader set of practice areas”.175
In relation to these challenges, this paper argues that enhanced linkage with
mine action can support SSR in dealing with the provision of security in both
short and long terms. In the short term, mine action can strengthen SSR through
not only PSSM but also all its core activities. In particular, the overlap between
SSR and the five constitutive pillars of mine action176 could be more strongly
stated, especially for victim assistance and MRE, which reflect human security
concerns.
In the long term, support to SSR is possible in two ways. First, mine action
demands the development of institutions, policies and a legal framework for
programmes dealing with mines, ERW and cluster munitions. In this regard, closer
cooperation between SSR and mine action would contribute to effectiveness and
accountability of the security sector and would be a step in preventing relapse into
conflict.177 Second, the pillars of victim assistance, MRE and advocacy are related
to human rights and create a link with reconciliation and justice components. The
relevance of these pillars is based on mine-action-related conventions that require
States Parties to provide assistance to victims; on the Maputo Action Plan that
demands integration of such assistance into the national legal frameworks;178 and
on the CCM that mentions the need for age- and gender-sensitive assistance.179
Moreover, the three pillars promote the development of civil society and its
role as an active actor in the oversight of the security sector. These three pillars
rely on the involvement of civil society organizations for raising awareness on
people’s rights, assisting mine victims, conducting training in risk education and
building support for the conventions. Ultimately, the pillars have the potential
to contribute to SSR by supporting local ownership and accountability and
improving effectiveness by addressing people’s security concerns.

National ownership and capacity development
As seen in the second section, national ownership is a central principle in mine
action and has been referred to as “a cornerstone” of the APMBC and IMAS.180
Increasing numbers of countries affected by mines and ERW are approaching
completion181 of identifying and clearing all known contaminated areas, thereby
transitioning from a phase of predominantly proactive survey and clearance
activities to one of reactive response to reported threats. This transition means
that concepts related to national capacity development and national ownership
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become more central, as there is a greater focus on sustainable national capacities
to manage residual contamination,182 rather than relying on internationally
funded operators to carry out the work. The transition to a reactive approach
also means that mine action capacities may be reduced in size and integrated in
broader security structures such as the military or the police, thus interaction will
increase in the future between mine action and security providers which may not
have been involved during the proactive phase of mine action.
A limited number of mine-affected countries have enjoyed full national
ownership of their mine action programmes from the very onset of survey and
clearance activities. Nicaragua is a rare example of this: the Nicaraguan army
cleared all minefields while benefiting from support from the Organization
of American States (OAS). In most countries, however, it is predominantly
international mine action organizations that implement proactive survey and
clearance activities, with marginal or no involvement of national operators
and national police and army. In several cases UNMAS and UNDP coordinate
mine action programmes on behalf of affected countries. This underlines the
importance of developing national capacities and ownership.
An example of successful capacity development and collaboration between
SSR and mine action can be found in Liberia, illustrating how UNMAS
implemented capacity development training with the national security providers
and, with its implementing partner, collaborated effectively with several SSR
stakeholders.
The Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and Liberia National Police (LNP)
committed serious crimes against the civilian population during the 14-year civil
war, resulting in little trust in the national security services. Recognizing this,
key stakeholders in the Comprehensive Peace Accord process acknowledged the
importance of reforming the security sector by including SSR in the August 2003
agreement.
As a result, UNMIL was established in September 2003 with a number of
tasks related to SSR, including assisting Liberia’s transitional government in
monitoring and restructuring the LNP and forming a new and restructured AFL.
Furthermore, UNMIL was responsible for responding to hazardous threats and
carrying out explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)183 of residual contamination.
The transition plan outlining the transfer of responsibilities from UNMIL to the
Liberian government foresaw that, by 2015, UNMIL’s military capacity would be
reduced to one engineering unit with EOD capacity, and that EOD responsibilities should be handed over to the AFL that same year.184
Given the gradual reduction of UNMIL troops and the resulting decline
in EOD capacity, a 2011 internal UNMIL gap assessment identified the need
to develop national EOD capacity. On this basis, UNMIL requested UNMAS
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to support transitioning the EOD response from UNMIL to national security
services. UNMAS established a project in mid-2013 with the objective of training
32 AFL members as EOD operators.185
While significant training targeting the AFL had been under way in Liberia
for several years, it was only when UNMAS established its presence there in 2013
that activities related to national clearance capacity development truly started.
After successfully completing the training, AFL personnel carried out one EOD
task in 2013 and nine in the first four months of 2014, a clear indication of the
AFL’s strengthened capacity to respond to and address residual contamination.186
Stockpiles of conventional weapons such as mines and cluster munitions have
traditionally been the responsibility of the armed forces. Stockpile destruction
is therefore another thematic area where SSR and mine action interact on the
ground, and several examples illustrate how mine action organizations work with
national armies in such processes. The engagement of Norwegian People’s Aid
(NPA), one of the biggest mine action operators globally, is a prominent example
in this context and warrants closer analysis. NPA has developed the Self-Help
Ammunition Destruction Options Worldwide (SHADOW) programme that seeks
to assist states with the timely destruction of their cluster munition stockpiles. The
programme responds to a clear need to identify safe, practical and cost-effective
solutions for local and national small-scale cluster munition stockpile destruction.
The first national self-help project was undertaken in Moldova in 2010, designed
by NPA and the Moldovan Ministry of Defence (MOD). While the demolition
stage of the process was entirely controlled by and the responsibility of the MOD
and the national army, NPA developed capacities and provided supervision to
army personnel for the disassembly stage of the destruction process.187 The implementation phase resulted in the destruction of Moldova’s cluster bomb stockpiles
in just 17 days.188 As of November 2014, NPA had implemented SHADOW
projects in Croatia, Macedonia, Mozambique and Serbia and is planning activities
in additional countries.
NPA notes that national ownership is a precondition for the successful
implementation of SHADOW activities, as they depend on close collaboration
and coordination with senior representatives of national governments and
security providers.189 NPA emphasizes that it is critical to secure high-level
political commitment at the national level, and to identify “national champions”
on which the organization can rely. NPA believes that its notable involvement in
the CCM at the international political level has facilitated its strong relationships
with several CCM States Parties. These have in turn been instrumental for the
successful implementation of SHADOW.
Interestingly, and perhaps contrary to expectations, NPA has not experienced
any particular challenges during its interactions with national militaries in
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implementation of activities, and points out that working closely with these
militaries has been a very positive experience.190 The fact that NPA receives
SHADOW-related requests from the highest government levels, including from
senior representatives of ministries of defence and foreign affairs, means that a
high-level commitment is secured from the outset.
The SHADOW programme is an interesting example of an international
mine action NGO providing capacity development support to national security
services, thereby strengthening national ownership of the destruction process
while contributing to fulfilling obligations under international law.

Good governance: Transparency, accountability and effectiveness
As seen in the previous sections, mine action conventions and IMAS create a
solid international framework composed of both legal and non-legal norms.
There is thus significant potential for joint work between SSR and mine action
based on their shared commitment to the principles of good governance. In
particular, better links between these two communities of practice would, on the
one hand, improve transparency, accountability and effectiveness of mine action
institutions and programmes; on the other hand, they would make SSR more
comprehensive by better including mine action, which has the potential to be
more than a related process, as indicated in the standard representation of SSR
(illustrated in Figure 1), because in some post-conflict contexts it can actually be
one of the most relevant security issues.
Despite this potential for synergies, SSR and mine action programmes do
not interact significantly on good governance issues. While some examples from
the field illustrate the interest in nurturing interlinkages between SSR and mine
action, they equally show that there is currently limited cooperation among these
two communities of practice.
Nepal is a case in point to underscore that the effectiveness of mine action is
at some point undermined by the lack of a proper institutional set-up ensuring
transparency and civilian oversight. This is well documented in a study by the
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)191 that
analyses the achievements and challenges in establishing mine action institutions
in the aftermath of the civil war. The study notes that despite the important
accomplishment of freeing the country from the threat of mines and developing
capacity for addressing the remaining threat from IEDs, mine action in Nepal has
had some limitations.
In particular, the analysis points out that Nepal lacks “the institutional
architecture for a national mine action programme under civilian coordination and
oversight”.192 The Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction was supposed to become
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the civilian centre for coordination and oversight of national programmes, but
failed to assume this role because it lacked the capacities in information and quality
management. In addition, the Mine Action Steering Committee did not adopt a
national mine action strategy, failed to develop national standards and guidelines,
and became as ineffective as the Mine Action Joint Working Group – a body
responsible for coordination between civilian and security actors in mine action.193
Due to the lack of civilian institutions, mine action has remained essentially
in the hands of the Nepal Army (NA), and this is not without consequences.
The NA Mine Action Coordination Centre (NAMACC) has retained the capacity
to use the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA),194 but
data on victims are not included because the NA maintains that it does not have
any mandate for tracking victims. Data on victims have instead been kept by
the human rights NGO Informal Sector Service,195 which does not have IMSMA
capacity. Therefore, data on mines and mine-related incidents entered into
IMSMA are neither comprehensive nor complete.
In addition, information requests about mine incidents have to be addressed
to NAMACC and must follow military channels, which is an obstacle for demands
from civilian organizations. According to the authors of the study, only a new
constitution and a significant SSR process would create the necessary space for a
reconfiguration of the institutional responsibilities in mine action.196
The example of Nepal provides a number of lessons. First, it demonstrates
that the broader governance of the security sector has an important influence
on the overall management of mine action. In fact, the NA control over mine
action is related to the incompleteness of the reforms included in the peace
agreements.197 Second, the lack of civilian leadership undermines not only
mine action accountability but also its effectiveness, as information sharing is
weakened. Consequently, SSR is seen as a key process for improving mine action
institutions and programmes.
The importance of the governance dimension is also demonstrated by the
case of Ukraine, which is confronted with a contamination problem from past
conflicts, excessive stockpiles from the Soviet era and new contamination from
mines and unexploded ordnance due to the crisis in its eastern and southeastern
regions.198
In Ukraine there is no single body in charge of mine action at the time of
writing and responsibilities are distributed among a number of institutions. The
main institution is the State Emergency Service (SES), which is currently under
the Ministry of Interior199 but in the past it was a ministry in itself. Alongside the
SES, there is the MOD with the armed forces’ engineer corps, border guards and
the Ministry of Infrastructure with its Special Transportation Service in charge of
clearing transport infrastructure such as railways and highways. This situation
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creates important challenges in terms of coordination, duplication of capacities
and lack of clarity about responsibilities for clearance.200
The Ukrainian state is aware of these challenges, and has started drafting
a mine action law to establish a single body responsible for mine action. This
process is complicated by the current conflict, which makes it difficult to separate
humanitarian from military demining activities clearly. A presidential decree
has assigned mine action activities to the MOD,201 and the MOD is reluctant to
relinquish its responsibilities to a civilian body as some activities related to mine
action are perceived to be a matter of national security. Particularly sensitive are
the sharing of information and access to areas close to the front lines.
Ukraine has received assistance in dealing with mines in the past, and
the current conflict has increased the international presence in both SSR
and mine action. The European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security
Sector Reform was established in July 2014 with a mandate to provide advisory,
mentoring and support services to law enforcement agencies (police, border
guards, national guard, penitentiary and security service), the judiciary and
public prosecution, and also includes cross-cutting aspects like anti-corruption,
human rights, public administration reform and strategic communication.202 In
June 2015 the UN Mine Action Sub-Cluster was established under the chair of
UNDP and the Danish Demining Group (DDG), and gathers state authorities
and international actors working in mine action.203 DDG is active in MRE,
surveys and building demining capacities.204 The Swiss Foundation for Mine
Action and the International Trust Fund for Human Security are also active in
MRE.205 In addition, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine (OSCE PCU) has been in the country since
1999 and has helped Ukraine in enhancing its security, legislation, institutions
and practices according to democratic standards to build “a secure environment
for its people”.206 In mine action specifically, the OSCE PCU has supported the
Ukrainian SES in developing its capacities.207 NATO has been active in support
of the destruction of landmines, SALW, ammunition and human-portable
air-defence systems through its Trust Fund.208
Despite the significance of this international presence, there is limited
interaction between SSR and mine action with few exceptions. The sub-cluster
members provided comments on the draft law in July 2015.209 The GICHD, in
partnership with the OSCE PCU and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), organized a conference to support Ukraine in
the establishment of mine action institutions and continues to provide assistance
on this matter.210 This activity has proven the relevance of good governance in mine
action, because the establishment of a single effective, accountable and civilian
agency in mine action would produce several benefits including the capacity to:
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•• address issues of information gathering and sharing on contamination;
•• build local capacities;
•• facilitate coordination with international stakeholders;
•• facilitate fundraising.
However, this GICHD, DCAF and OSCE PCU initiative is an isolated case and
faces the challenges of bridging communities that usually do not interact. Mine
action actors are more focused on operational matters such as the delivery of MRE
and marking and clearing land, and tend to leave institutional development to
other actors. Overall, the Ukraine case confirms that the mine action community
of practice has margin to enhance its engagement in good governance issues,
and SSR can provide valuable assistance to mine action by introducing a more
political- and conflict-sensitive analysis.

People-centred approach and human rights
Not many concrete examples were found where SSR and mine action contribute
jointly – directly or indirectly – to the protection and promotion of human rights.
But one case in point relates to efforts undertaken in the CAR since 2014 under
the umbrella of MINUSCA, of which UNMAS, human rights and SSR are
components.
The history of violations of IHL and human rights in the CAR is tragically rich,
involving both security forces and armed groups. The need for SSR goes far back,
but in the aftermath of elections in 2005, when General Bozizé was elected two
years after seizing power, violence took on a new momentum with the political and
security dysfunctions of the state continuing to threaten stability and legitimacy.
Armed groups challenged state power, and regular forces – including the Forces
armées centrafricaines (FACA) – carried out security-sapping activities, including
gross human rights abuses. It was also the time when the need to start thinking
about the structural causes of conflict, including the set-up and functioning of the
entire security system, was increasingly recognized. In 2008 SSR efforts to reform
the FACA and other security providers began. These attempts largely failed before,
but also in light of, the resumption of large-scale violence in 2012.211
In late 2012 violence resumed between the mainly Muslim Séléka rebel
coalition and the government, and did not cease despite the 2013 Libreville peace
agreement between the Bozizé government and the rebels. After the ousting of
President Bozizé by the Séléka in March 2013, a transitional government took
office. Conflict became more and more sectarian between the Séléka and the
mainly Christian anti-Balaka movement, which led the UN Secretary-General to
warn of the risk of a sectarian partition of the CAR.212 Across the country security
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deteriorated, leading to weak government authority and control over national
territory, human right abuses with total impunity and a severe humanitarian
and protection crisis, with civilians being targeted by all armed groups. Security
forces have contributed to general insecurity and committed numerous human
rights violations against civilians.213 Under these circumstances, the UN Security
Council took action by establishing MINUSCA in March 2014.
Accountability and justice measures are recognized as essential in any peace
and reconciliation process and to prevent ongoing violations in the short term.214
Thus in the mandate of MINUSCA the Security Council stressed the need to
end impunity and bring to justice perpetrators of violations and abuses – hence
the critical role of SSR, specifically recognized by the Security Council215 – and
to disarm, demobilize, reintegrate and repatriate (DDRR) former combatants
and armed elements. This imperative also applies to security forces, which,
as described above, have a record of human rights abuses. As a consequence,
MINUSCA supports SSR processes.216 Vetting for human rights and other abuses
has become a precondition for integration into the army.217
Similarly, the Security Council mandated MINUSCA to support the
transitional authorities to “address the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation,
and misuse of small arms and light weapons in the CAR, and to ensure the safe
and effective management, storage and security of stockpiles of small arms
and light weapons”.218 Surplus, seized, unmarked or illicitly held weapons and
ammunition should also be collected and destroyed. UNMAS, being the UN focal
point for mine action, assumes these responsibilities.
The deteriorated security situation has in fact facilitated the circulation of
large quantities of weapons, obsolete ammunition and small arms ammunition.
The UN recorded that 83 per cent of the obsolete ammunition and explosive
remnants and 99 per cent of ammunition holdings had disappeared from
inspected stockpiles between December 2012 and November 2013.219 Related
to these humanitarian and security risks, and at the same time contributing to
them, large quantities of ammunition are poorly stored and managed.
On this basis UNMAS supports PSSM, which in the CAR implies the
construction of safe and secured armouries and ammunition depots.220 As a
concrete example, on 27 April 2015 MINUSCA, through UNMAS and under the
guidance of SSR, initiated the construction of a permanent armoury in Camp
Kassaï with the capacity to store 1,000 weapons.221 The armoury will help the
transitional authorities to control the illicit transfer of arms better while ensuring
their marking and safe management.222 This effort is part of the strategy to
reconstruct the armed forces.
The Security Council clearly stressed that these weapons-related activities
should be incorporated into SSR and DDR/DDRR programmes.223 The call for
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integration rests on the wider recognition of the links between national SALW
management, reduction of armed violence, human rights issues and SSR.224
The support provided by UNMAS to the transitional government in the CAR
is a case in point of how these interlinkages can be effectively implemented.
The respective activities of UNMAS and the SSR and human rights units of
the mission are coordinated under the pillar of the political Deputy Special
Representative of the Secretary-General; while UNMAS is mandated to support
weapons and ammunition management, the SSR unit addresses structural and
governance challenges.
Human rights violations and abuses are a major concern in the CAR, and
the need for bold action against impunity and in vetting security sector personnel
is significant. Furthermore, in accordance with its human rights due diligence
policy, the UN is obliged to withdraw support from security actors who commit
human rights violations or fail to address them.225 The issue of constructing
armouries might possibly be wisely used to leverage increased focus by the
transitional government on human rights due diligence within its security sector.
Such commitment, as well as the safety of storage sites, might also be considered
under certain circumstances as among the prerequisites for the return of collected
weapons to the transitional government. In his statement on the occasion of the
opening of the construction site at Camp Kassaï, Under-Secretary-General Hervé
Ladsous at least finely alluded to this when praising in this context the initiatives
of the MOD and the general staff to develop an operational army that is irreproachable and responding increasingly to international norms.226
While this remark might seem anecdotal, it perfectly illustrates the interplay
between broader mine action and SSR on the ground, and how the operationalization of such linkages can inform and contribute indirectly to the promotion
of human rights. It is argued that such successful cross-fertilization among
domains has the potential to be more widely explored when the specific political
and operational circumstances on the ground allow.
As for human rights, research has shown that while each domain focuses
extensively on integrating and mainstreaming gender and diversity in its
respective operations, concrete joint projects are missing. The question therefore
arises of whether stronger cooperation on this matter is relevant on the ground.
As demonstrated conceptually, gender and diversity are cross-cutting issues with
importance for both SSR and mine action, particularly in relation to institutions,
recruitment, planning and delivery of support. Only when being inclusive can
SSR and mine action be effective and achieve the greatest impact. Collecting and
analysing gender-disaggregated data also represent important tasks of both SSR
and mine action projects on the ground.

48

Ursign Hofmann, Gianluca Maspoli, Åsa Massleberg and Pascal Rapillard

The common interest in the topic and the benefits from synergies of cooperation
have started to be recognized, at least at headquarters level, as testified by an
initiative of several Geneva-based organizations active in peace and security.
In January 2015 a collaboration between DCAF, the Geneva Centre for Security
Policy, the GICHD, Small Arms Survey and the Gender and Mine Action
Programme, which are all housed at the Maison de la paix premises, resulted
in the establishment of the Maison de la paix Gender and Diversity Hub. The
strength of this initiative consists in bringing together under one umbrella the
gender and diversity expertise of each organization in its specific thematic field
and capitalizing on the resulting synergies, increased outreach and impact.
Given that promoting gender equality and diversity are integral both to SSR
and mine action (and to other related fields such as SALW and security policy) and
that, in some instances, both domains work with the same or similar stakeholders,
it can be reasonably argued that joint delivery of gender and diversity support
and advice lead to increased understanding of the gender- and diversity-related
linkages for broader security and improved SSR and mine action programmes.
The activities of the Gender and Diversity Hub will provide an opportunity to
assess whether this assumption holds true.

Broadening mandates: Mine action organizations and security providers
After reviewing the operationalization – or lack thereof – of conceptual
commonalities between SSR and mine action, this subsection adds a further
analytical layer to the linkages between the SSR and mine action communities
by examining how the trend for mine action organizations to broaden their
activities has led to increased interaction with the security sector and whether
this interaction has already or may in future yield synergies.
This trend is driven by the recognition that, in some contexts, expertise and
capacities of mine action organizations are relevant and applicable to respond
to needs in fields of activities beyond core mine action.227 Interaction with these
other domains brings the potential to contribute significantly to a response which
is more efficient, better targeted and has greater impact. Another factor that has
prompted mine action organizations to broaden their support is their proven
ability to work in unstable and conflict-affected contexts. This type of expertise
has enabled them to work in environments of multiple risks where SALW, IEDs
and ammunition often pose additional and mutually reinforcing threats.
Other key factors are normative and diplomatic developments in recent
years on SALW control, ammunition management and linking armed violence
and development. Examples include the Arms Trade Treaty, the UN Programme
of Action on SALW control,228 regional agreements such as the 2006 Economic
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Community of West African States Convention on Small Arms and Light
Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials, the IATG, ISACS and
the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development. These instruments
have provided mine action organizations with an important framework to assess
and offer, where applicable, broader assistance to states. Requests for support
have often been facilitated by the relationships established and trust developed
between states and organizations during traditional mine action operations.
The following paragraphs highlight a series of cases in which previously
traditional mine action organizations have started to address broader threats to
security: the OAS SALW and ammunition destruction programme in Guatemala,
DDG’s Community Safety Programme in Uganda, a PSSM project undertaken
by UNMAS and HALO Trust in Côte d’Ivoire and HALO Trust’s involvement in
DDR in Afghanistan. These projects were selected for their strong interaction
with security forces and SSR processes.
Firstly, the broadening of their fields of activities led mine action organizations
to deal with the destruction of SALW and ammunition, exemplified by OAS
engagement in Guatemala. In that country more than 200,000 people were
killed and many more subjected to human rights violations during the 36-year
internal armed conflict.229 Since the 1996 peace accords donors have invested
significant amounts of money in security and justice reform, but with little
result. Guatemala remains one of the most violent countries in the world, with
a homicide rate of 34 per 100,000 persons in 2013, twice the Latin American
average.230 The level of violence and prevailing sense of insecurity are exacerbated
by a lack of police capacity and mistrust of government security forces in many
sectors of Guatemalan society.231 Guatemala has also become a regional hub for
the trafficking of SALW and ammunition.
Following a fire in 2005 at a military ammunition storage depot containing
highly volatile white phosphorus based within densely populated Guatemala City,
the white phosphorus was stored in temporary bunkers. For five years no action
was taken to address the underlying problem, and the phosphorus continued
to deteriorate. This increasingly posed an environmental and security threat,
along with the fear that other ammunition depots in urban areas were at risk of
igniting. Thus the Guatemalan military identified the need to reduce the risk of
unplanned explosions and improve its stockpile management capacity. Guatemala
had significant stocks of ammunition resulting from obsolete weaponry and
surpluses beyond national defence and security needs.232
In 2010, when the OAS was approached to assist with destroying the legacy
of the 2005 accident, it started to support the safe removal and management
of ammunition.233 This support reflects an internal evolution within the OAS
which culminated in the establishment of a dedicated programme of assistance
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for control of arms and ammunition, in addition to its traditional programme for
comprehensive action against anti-personnel mines.
An initial survey in 2010 carried out by the OAS and its contractor Golden
West, an expert humanitarian NGO, concluded that 600 tons required destruction,
much of which consisted of excess, expired and obsolete ammunition.234 With
inadequate stockpile management, excess weapons and ammunition cannot be
identified and pose a grave year-to-year risk.235 However, Guatemala, like other
countries in the region, lacked capacity, especially in the Ordnance Service of
the Ministry of National Defence in charge of munitions storage facilities. In
response to this need, the OAS assisted the military in identifying, transporting
and eliminating both small- and large-calibre explosive ammunition located in
military storage sites in densely populated areas, and delivered specialized training
in destruction and demolition techniques. As a result of the project, Guatemala’s
problem of excess and obsolete ammunition has largely been addressed.236
In addition, the OAS started to be involved in SALW destruction. As previously
mentioned, Guatemala has become a regional hub for SALW trafficking with
significant levels of illicit arms in circulation. With training, technical and logistical
assistance, and equipment provided by the OAS, the Guatemalan military has
worked with the judicial authorities to destroy SALW that were seized. Finally,
the Guatemalan military has also taken steps to destroy its own supplies of excess
and obsolete SALW.237
This OAS project focusing on SALW and ammunition destruction has had
an important impact on the physical security of ammunition storage sites and
the availability of SALW. Furthermore, it has greatly contributed to enhancing
the effectiveness of the security sector. Collaboration between the Guatemalan
military and the OAS has enhanced the credibility of the military, and of the
ammunition and SALW destruction process.238
Engaging with the agents of violence is another example of how mine action
organizations broaden their mandate, illustrated by DDG’s Community Safety
Programme in Uganda. The Karamoja region suffers from high levels of conflict
and insecurity and is one of the most marginalized in Uganda, with 82 per cent
of the population living below the poverty line.239 The region is characterized
by protracted interclan conflicts over cattle, grazing land and access to other
resources.
The Karamajong are semi-nomadic pastoralists who depend on cattle grazing
and cattle raiding for their livelihoods. In the 1970s cattle herds were reduced by
drought and disease, which led to increased raiding. The increased frequency of
raids led to an increased demand for weapons, for both raiding and defending
herds. With the growing proliferation of SALW since the 1970s, the lethality of
interclan cattle raids has increased dramatically. A 2008 estimate indicated that
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with a small arms death rate of 600 per 100,000, Karamoja has the highest level
of SALW-related deaths and injuries in Uganda.240
An assessment conducted by Saferworld revealed rampant abuse by security
providers, lack of access to them, lack of information on their activities and lack
of community consultation. Many residents complained that the police were
not proactive in engaging communities, and people remained unaware of their
rights.241 In spite of their violent behaviour, communities consider the presence
of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) as necessary to provide security
to farms and recover stolen livestock, but they maintain a better relationship with
local councils and traditional elders.242
DDG was founded in the late 1990s, initially specializing in clearing landmines
and unexploded ordnance, but has expanded its activities from traditional mine
action to include broader initiatives aimed to prompt positive change in the
agents as well as institutional and cultural environments of violence.243 Active
in Uganda through a mine/ERW clearance programme in association with the
UPDF and the Uganda Police Force (UPF) since 2007, DDG decided to expand
its operations by launching a programme to improve community safety in the
conflict-prone Karamoja region. With its Community Safety Programme, DDG
strives to create the preconditions for sustainable development by addressing the
causes and impacts of instability, conflict and armed violence. It aims especially
to develop the capacity of communities to mitigate conflict at all levels and the
capacity of formal security providers to meet the security needs of communities.
The first phase of the project consists of in-depth consultations with key
security providers, in particular the UPDF and UPF. Actual implementation commences upon permission from communities, with the establishment
of community safety plans. These focus on clarifying participants’ vision of
community safety and developing an action plan. Community safety committees,
including elders, women, youth, political leaders and security providers, are then
responsible for implementing the action plans.244
Subsequently, conflict management education is delivered alongside efforts
to strengthen existing formal and informal judicial systems to resolve conflict.
Education takes place at village level with the participation of about 70–100
households. DDG is also delivering conflict management education for the
police and UPDF. Education is complemented by SALW sensitization, which is a
sensitive issue as SALW ownership is illegal in Uganda and also because government-sponsored forced disarmament campaigns, implemented by the UPDF,
have involved extrajudicial executions and torture of the Karamajong.245
Finally, in response to past abuse and human rights violations by security
forces, DDG facilitates regular meetings between community representatives
and their main security providers. At the end of these meetings, resolutions
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are agreed and signed by all participants. Examples of issues discussed include
the mistreatment of people by the UPF and UPDF, rapes by security providers
and the wearing of traditional scarves by young warriors, which security forces
believed were concealing SALW.246
DDG’s Community Safety Programme has clearly had a significant
positive impact. Regular meetings between communities and security providers
contributed to reduced violence. What is more, in 2010 27.7 per cent of participating
community members in five parishes stated that their trust in the police was very
good. This figure increased to 41.1 per cent in 2011.247 Slight improvements in the
relationship between communities and the UPDF were also recorded. Security
providers have noted that community members have become more open about
reporting cases, and communities have stated that the security providers have
become more sensitive when dealing with them.248
While some mine action organizations have addressed the agents of armed
violence, as illustrated in DDG’s Community Safety Programme, their broadening
support mainly relates thus far to PSSM. This new field of activity is illustrated by
a joint UNMAS–HALO Trust project in Côte d’Ivoire.
In 2002 Côte d’Ivoire started to endure conflict between the north, which
was held by rebels, and the south, controlled by then President Laurent Gbabgo’s
forces. Violence rose significantly following the 2010 presidential elections, when
intense fighting broke out between Gbabgo and election winner Ouattara. During
these long years of conflict, armouries and ammunition depots were looted and
damaged across the country and a significant amount of arms and ammunition
got into civilian and militia hands. According to the Small Arms Survey, the
number of illicit arms in circulation increased considerably during the crisis.249
Following the crisis, the UN received reports that mines had been laid along
the line of confidence which divided the north and south of the country. The
chief of the UNOCI DDR Division contacted UNMAS for assistance to confirm
whether there was contamination. Beyond confirming unexploded ordnance
and IED contamination, the initial assessment also highlighted a problem with
abandoned ordnance, while noting that arms and ammunition in Republican
Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI), gendarmerie and police depots and armouries
had been looted. UNOCI DDR therefore asked UNMAS to increase ammunition
storage safety.250 As a result of UN Security Council Resolution 2000 (2011),
UNMAS established a programme reporting to the DDR–SSR Division aiming
to contribute to “protection and security”, including via SALW collection and
disposal, for the stabilization and reconstruction of the country.251
An institutional set-up was therefore put in place fostering close interaction
between UNMAS and the SSR and DDR activities of UNOCI. This temporary252
location of UNMAS under the DDR–SSR chapeau was considered helpful, especially
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to facilitate UNMAS access to security forces. Nonetheless, this example also sheds
light on the need to create initial awareness and a shared understanding among the
mine action, DDR and SSR communities after deployment to a mission.253
A national assessment of 56 police, gendarmerie and FRCI weapons and
ammunition storage facilities between October 2011 and the end of June 2012
indicated that all sites would require significant improvements and that, if
management practices were not enhanced, large-scale explosions could occur.
The assessment revealed that in many cases ammunition was stored in buildings
that were not originally designed as ammunition storage facilities and did not
meet international standards.254
This assessment informed planning for the establishment of secure
temporary stores and the rehabilitation and future management of the regular
sites. Hence, among other activities, UNMAS supports UNOCI’s SSR mandate by
developing capacities of the national security forces to rehabilitate and refurbish
their armouries and ammunition storage areas and developing their required
technical expertise for efficient management of such sites.255
To achieve this objective, UNMAS contracted the NGO HALO Trust to
implement a PSSM programme. Since then, HALO Trust and UNMAS have
worked closely with the Ivorian authorities to build or renovate more than 190
stores and armouries and develop capacities of the security forces in safe weapons
and ammunition management and destruction.256
While Côte d’Ivoire is another good example of capacity development, it also
illustrates that support to address the threats of unsecured and/or inadequately
managed stockpiles has created valuable synergies between UNMAS and SSR.257
In 2013 UNOCI rightly pointed out that it would be of great importance to include
PSSM in the drafting of the national defence policy.258 Finally, it is a testimony
to increased interaction between mine action organizations and broader security
providers. In fact, the government of Côte d’Ivoire and the security forces,
recognizing the risks posed by unsecured arms and ammunition, established a
national PSSM working group which meets monthly and is chaired by the head of
the FRCI Logistics Division. Beyond its purpose of exchanging good practice on
PSSM, the group serves as a platform for planning and meeting training needs.
UNMAS and HALO Trust are members of the group, as are representatives of the
armed forces, gendarmerie and police.259
Before turning to interaction between SSR and mine action via DDR, it is
worth noting that it is not a given that mine action organizations involved in
PSSM are able to create linkages to SSR. A case in point is the experience of
the NGO Mines Advisory Group (MAG) in Burundi. From 2007 to 2013 MAG
worked with the Burundian police and army to develop their capacities to secure
and manage their SALW stockpiles safely. MAG also trained army personnel to
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destroy surplus and obsolete weapons and ammunition.260 By enhancing the
capacity of armourers in the management of SALW and storage sites, MAG
certainly contributed to the professionalization of the country’s security and
defence forces. It also made several attempts to link its PSSM support to wider
SSR. However, it experienced challenges in engaging with SSR stakeholders on
the ground. It appears that, at the time of MAG’s PSSM project in Burundi, the
wider SSR community considered that PSSM fell outside the scope of SSR.261
Securing financial support for MAG’s PSSM project from SSR donors
proved to be equally challenging. Especially the Netherlands has been very active
in supporting SSR in Burundi, not least since the establishment of the Burundi–
Netherlands Security Sector Development programme262 in 2009. The programme
has proven instrumental to build momentum towards greater transparency and
accountability, and has been recognized as having the potential to lead effectively
to governance results.263 MAG was initially included in the ﬁrst two-year block
of programme projects with the Burundian police. However, funding for MAG’s
PSSM activities was discontinued, since the Netherlands no longer considered
PSSM to be part of its wider SSR priorities. The weak link between PSSM and
SSR was also articulated in Burundi’s 2012–2015 strategic plan for SSR, in which
PSSM ﬁgures only minimally.264
As a final example of the increasing involvement of mine action organizations
in related fields of activity, the paper sheds light on the linkages between SSR and
mine action on the ground through DDR. The success of SSR projects is often
linked to effective demilitarization, and some authors argue that DDR and SSR
should be planned, resourced, implemented and evaluated together.265 As the
following example mainly focuses on mine action organizations’ efforts in the
reintegration aspect of DDR, it is worth highlighting that successful reintegration
directly contributes to the shared DDR–SSR objective of ensuring effective and
sustainable transition of former combatants to civilian life. Failed reintegration
can undermine SSR by putting pressure on police, courts and prisons, in addition
to representing a security threat for the state and communities.266
Hence it seems logical that in Afghanistan DDR has been conceived as a
pillar in SSR following the adoption of a peacebuilding and political transition
roadmap – the Bonn Agreement – in late 2001.267 In this context, Afghanistan’s
New Beginnings Programme used demining training as a way to reintegrate
former combatants from the Afghan military forces into civilian life between
2004 and 2006. The steady income and benefits proved attractive to former
combatants who were reintegrated into the workforce: 75 per cent were still
working as deminers one month after the end of the programme, demonstrating
an encouraging retention potential within mine action.268
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In the subsequent Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP),
started in 2010, much weight was again put on reintegration, this time aimed
at insurgents. Mine action’s contribution to DDR falls within the third phase of
reintegration, which is designed to demonstrate to communities the benefits of
maintaining peace.269
The APRP refers reintegrees to participating demining agencies after they
have been vetted, enrolled and provided with a stipend for transition assistance.
By including both former insurgents and non-combatants, the APRP is careful
not to “reward” those who participated in conflict or to exacerbate tensions
within the community. Very importantly, reintegrees begin receiving a salary
from day one of demining training, immediately relieving pressure to return to
conflict for monetary reasons. In 2010 HALO Trust started to employ former
combatants as deminers, and thus to support DDR explicitly. This initiative was
based on HALO Trust’s belief that by promoting peace and stability in its areas of
operation, it would be able to perform its core activities better while at the same
time contributing to broader peacebuilding goals. When reintegrees graduate
from the training, they are assigned to demining teams that are deployed in the
same way as all other HALO Trust teams.270
Many other APRP activities require a significant timespan to demonstrate
results to both reintegrees and communities; in contrast, reintegration as deminers
shows benefits from the first day of training. While demining has remained
a small component of the overall APRP, it has proven to be an important and
effective means of demonstrating the benefits of peace. Another added value of
having reintegrated former combatants in teams alongside community deminers
is that reconciliation is effectively nurtured. They learn to work together with
former enemies towards a common goal. Deminers must be able to trust one
another fully to work safely in the field.271 HALO Trust has reintegrated hundreds
of former Taliban and Hezbi Islami combatants in Baghlan and Kunduz provinces
into its demining ranks and trained them as community-based deminers.272
Assisting directly in DDR initiatives can have repercussions for a neutral
humanitarian organization such as HALO Trust. The employment of former
combatants of an ongoing insurgency could be perceived by some as a partisan
act siding with the government. While some assessments of HALO Trust’s
involvement in DDR in Afghanistan conclude that the NGO did not encounter any
specific risks or threats as a result of the reintegration of former combatants,273
others testify that its employees were perceived as spies and threatened.274
Although the overall experience was seen as good, this clearly sheds light on the
new challenges and risks for humanitarian NGOs when engaging in inherently
political processes and working with former insurgents. As Blaney et al. pointed
out, “DDR and SSR are political and dangerous efforts as they dismantle the de
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facto institutions of power in conflict-affected countries. A general or warlord
may not welcome the suggestion to put down his gun and become a farmer. As
such, purely technical approaches to DDR and SSR will fail.”275
It is of course important for an NGO to mitigate these risks, for instance by
underlining and communicating its neutral and technical work and its benefits
for communities. Nevertheless, caution and close monitoring are required,
since reputation and trust are much more easily lost than built.276 Mine action
organizations may also need to reinforce security measures for this very reason,
since the risk of attacks against reintegrated fighters may increase.277 In conclusion,
the example of HALO Trust’s involvement in DDR in Afghanistan illustrates the
added value of mine action organizations’ contribution to reforming the security
sector.
In sum, it can be demonstrated that the common conceptual approaches of
SSR and mine action are resulting in concrete linkages between both communities
of practice in some areas, such as capacity development, national ownership and
the promotion of human rights, while such linkages are largely missing in others,
as in the case of gender and diversity. While this latter example might highlight
room for new opportunities, it also raises the fundamental question as to the limits
of potential synergies. Finally, the trend towards increased interaction between
mine action organizations and security providers identified in this section might
not necessarily be a given in all contexts.
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Conclusion
This paper focuses on three questions aiming at identifying the linkages between
SSR and mine action at conceptual and operational levels in post-conflict contexts.
We show that both SSR and mine action share a common understanding of
security: human security. This concept broadens the traditional state-centric
definition of security and adopts a people-centred perspective which encompasses
human safety, livelihood and dignity.
By focusing on national ownership, accountability and effectiveness, SSR
aims to create conditions that are conducive not only to state and human security,
but also to socio-economic development. Similarly, mine action actors have gone
beyond the immediate removal of mines and ERW for humanitarian purposes
and expanded their spectrum of activities to contribute to long-term development
and address wider threats related to conventional weapons. Finally, this pattern
of a broadening spectrum of activities and the recognition of the interdependencies of risks to state and human security match the qualitative change of UN
peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions, which today fully integrate SSR and
mine action where relevant.
The conceptual linkages between SSR and mine action are reflected by
significant commonalities in their approach to designing and implementing
programmes. This paper finds that both SSR and mine action programmes
promote national ownership, give significant attention to the development of
local capacities and seek to apply the principles of good governance. A people-centred, rights-based approach is at the core of SSR, not least because SSR mostly
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takes place in countries in which the security sector may have been a major
threat to the human rights of its own constituency. A focus on people and human
rights is also key in mine action, as it is anchored in international conventions
addressing the humanitarian consequences of mines and ERW. Finally, both SSR
and mine action mainstream gender equality and diversity, which are considered
fundamental to ensuring effective, accountable and non-discriminatory provision
of security.
Both domains have become components in UN peacekeeping and
peacebuilding missions. MINUSCA and UNOCI are good examples testifying to
the synergies from cooperation between SSR and mine action, with its increasingly
related domains such as PSSM and SALW. MINUSCA has a mandate to incorporate
PSSM into SSR and develop capacities in managing SALW. Connecting these
activities may contribute indirectly to the promotion of human rights. UNOCI
also gives PSSM an important role in the stabilization of the country. In addition
to these cases, the paper demonstrates that the broadening involvement of mine
action actors in related fields of activities has led them to work increasingly with
DDR and security actors that are traditional stakeholders in SSR programmes. As
illustrated by several examples, mine action can facilitate SSR by contributing to
the professionalization of national security and defence forces, and consequently
support capacity development and ownership.
Despite these positive trends, this paper also notes that interaction between
SSR and mine action is still limited at field level. The synergies between them are
mostly confined to PSSM and do not take advantage of the full spectrum of potential
activities (mine action’s five pillars) that could be conducted jointly to improve the
impact of interventions on the ground. In particular, the paper identifies some
areas in which opportunities for cooperation remain to be explored.
A potential area of cooperation is promotion of good governance. The example
of Ukraine, where efforts are being made to support the development of wellgoverned, efficient and accountable mine action institutions by combining SSR
and assistance to mine action, is an illustration of possible synergies. Another
area is gender and diversity, which is a shared approach and a priority of both
domains. The recent establishment of the Maison de la paix Gender and Diversity
Hub in Geneva might be a first and encouraging sign of increasingly joint work
on this critical aspect.
We recognize that some important differences between SSR and mine action
render synergies challenging and, consequently, may explain the limitations in
linking SSR and mine action in post-conflict contexts. A particular challenge is
to bridge the political dimension of SSR and the humanitarian origin of mine
action. On the one hand, this paper recognizes that SSR addresses politically
sensitive issues, especially in post-conflict contexts where state institutions are
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contested or weak and control over the security sector is key to political influence
and governance. On the other hand, it stresses that mine action has grown as
a humanitarian activity abiding by the principles of neutrality, impartiality and
independence. This feature has pushed mine action away from sensitive political
questions and reduced the room for cooperation with SSR.
Another challenge relates to the strong operational and technical focus
of mine action, which has at least three consequences. First, it may relegate
broader security and institutional issues to a second order of priority. Second,
the technical nature of mine action can overshadow its contribution to security
governance and, as demonstrated by the case of Burundi, SSR actors may simply
not perceive it as relevant to SSR. Third, there is often a “time lapse” because
mine action actors tend to be early on the ground and have their programmes
and network already established when SSR actors come into play. This renders
cooperation more difficult, requiring a readjustment of already ongoing mine
action programmes.
However, these differences should not undermine strong opportunities for
enhancing the interaction between SSR and mine action. These opportunities are
important, since they facilitate the delivery of SSR and mine action support by
combining expertise and experience. Building bridges and operationalizing the
shared approaches and objectives will prove valuable to address security issues
from a broader and more holistic perspective, leading to increased impact and
effectiveness of interventions.
Human security could play an important role to bridge divides and strengthen
the interaction between SSR and mine action. This concept provides a general
framework in which the specific goals of SSR and mine action are understood as
contributing to one single goal. The human security concept, with its people-centred approach and the relevance given to human rights, gender and diversity, is
instrumental in strengthening the existing common features between SSR and
mine action.
At a more practical level, the paper identifies specific areas where SSR
and mine action could benefit from improved cooperation. Mine action could
contribute to overcoming the challenges identified by the 2013 report of the UN
Secretary-General on SSR.278 In particular, it could help SSR in bridging shortand long-term security provision by dealing with immediate threats from mines
and ERW, on the one hand, and addressing longer-term challenges through the
development of local capacities and institutions on the other hand. In addition,
mine action has a more codified legal-normative framework than does SSR and
this could be used to leverage issues that are at the core of both mine action
and SSR agendas. Finally, the need for establishing mine action institutions is a
potential entry point for SSR programmes.
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Moreover, stronger linkages to SSR would be beneficial for a better understanding
of the broader political and security context in which mine action institutions
need to be developed. In other words, SSR’s holistic nature complements mine
action by providing a wider analysis of security needs and capacities. As seen in
the cases of Nepal and Ukraine, the development of mine action capacities (or
lack thereof) and their effectiveness are determined by the overall institutional
security framework. SSR actors could facilitate contact with other national
security stakeholders that are not among the usual interlocutors for mine action
organizations but play a role in establishing mine action programmes and
institutions, such as members of parliament.
Stronger interaction with security providers and SSR more generally also
seems to result naturally from recent trends in mine action. First, while many
mine-affected countries complete their clearance targets or treaty obligations,
residual contamination may remain to be addressed. Instead of dedicated mine
action institutions, this task often requires appropriate response capacities
streamlined into security providers such as the military or police. Second, as
mine action organizations increasingly address issues such as PSSM or DDR,
their primary interlocutors may no longer necessarily be humanitarian bodies,
but security actors. Given the ramifications of such issues in aspects of national
security, mine action organizations may need to pay more attention to political
considerations in the future and, as a result, take SSR priorities increasingly into
account.
Post-conflict contexts in particular tighten the relationship between SSR and
mine action for multiple reasons. First, in these environments mines and ERW
often constitute a severe threat to security and an impediment to development,
and must be addressed not only in the immediate aftermath of conflict but also
in the long term to support socio-economic development, access to social services
and the fulfilment of civic and human rights. Second, mine action requires
appropriate, effective and accountable institutions which SSR aims also to create.
Finally, these institutions and programmes involve a plurality of actors, from
state ministries and agencies to local and international civil society, NGOs and
corporations. Thus mine action has to address and solve issues and challenges
that are common to all the other pillars of the security sector. Ultimately, the
linkages between mine action and SSR demonstrate the importance of better
articulating the close and sometimes cross-cutting relationship between these
two agendas in order to improve the theory, policy and practice of post-conflict
peacebuilding.
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Security sector reform (SSR) and mine action share a strong common conceptual basis, which
draws from a shared understanding of security. They both reflect a conceptualization of security that
is not limited to the level of the state, but takes into account security threats and needs at societal
and individual levels. This common basis provides opportunities for synergies between SSR and
mine action. However, empirical evidence demonstrates that the strong conceptual basis is not fully
reflected in concrete activities, and the linkages remain limited and underexplored. Despite this
gap, there are positive examples showing the potential for synergies between SSR and mine action.
Ultimately, this paper maintains that the concept of human security provides a comprehensive
framework which can bridge the differences and open broader opportunities for cooperation, which
in turn will increase the impact of interventions in SSR and mine action.
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